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Searches During Routine Traffic Stops After
Robinson and Gustafson: A Re-Examination of the
Illinois Distinction Between "Ordinary Traffic
Violators" and "Criminals"
RONALD P. ALWIN*
Shortly after the Supreme Court announced its decision in United
States v. Robinson' and Gustafson v. Florida' a cartoon purporting
to depict the effect of the decisions appeared in one of the major
Chicago newspapers.3 The cartoon depicted a bewildered motorist,
stopped for a traffic violation, being patted down by one police
officer while another officer searched the car. The caption ominously stated, "Mister, the Supreme Court says if you drive with a
burned-out tail light, you belong to us."
The cartoon illustrates a common apprehension concerning the
effect of the Robinson-Gustafson decisions-namely that these decisions would be used to justify a search of the person and vehicle of
anyone stopped for a traffic violation. One commentator appropriately observed that these decisions appear to have spawned the
belief that police officers now may search any person or vehicle in
connection with a traffic offense.' In contrast to this belief, the
Robinson and Gustafson decisions, holding that police may conduct
a full search of a person incident to an arrest for a traffic violation,
were specifically limited to "full custodial arrests"5 in which the
traffic offender is taken into police custody and conveyed by police
vehicle to the stationhouse. The court of appeals in Robinson had
concluded that "routine traffic arrests, where there is no evidentiary
basis for a search and where the officer intends simply to issue a
notice of violation and to allow the offender to proceed" ' are governed by the standards of Terry v. Ohio7 and Sibron v. New York.'
*

Assistant Public Defender, Cook County, Illinois. B.A., 1962, Lawrence College; J.D.,
1964, University of Chicago Law School. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance
of Mary Therese Woodward, Senior Law Student, Loyola University of Chicago School of
Law, and Deborah Muys Bell, my secretary, in preparation of this article.
1. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
2. 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
3. Chicago Sun-Times, January 18, 1974, at 64, col. 2-3.
4. See Nakell, Search of the Person Incident to a Traffic Arrest: A Comment on Robinson
and Gustafson, 10 CRIM. L. BuLL. 827 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Nakell].
5. Several times in the course of both opinions the Court used the phrase "custodial
arrest" or "full custodial arrest" when discussing the rule which it was applying.
6. 471 F.2d 1082, 1097 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc).
7. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
8. 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
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However, the Supreme Court expressly reserved resolution of that
issue and clearly limited its holding to situations in which a "full
custody arrest" had been effected.'
The issue soon arose as to whether Robinson-Gustafsonshould be
extended to permit some type of search of a traffic violator who was
temporarily detained but neither arrested nor placed in custody for
the traffic offense. The Illinois Supreme Court recently confronted
such a case. In People v. Palmer0 the court held that a pre-arrest
pat-down search of a motorist stopped for driving without license
plates was not illegal and that the trial court properly had refused
to suppress a loaded .25 caliber revolver discovered during the
course of that search. The appellate court had held that the prearrest pat-down search was illegal because the officer had no reason
to fear for his safety." In reversing, the Supreme Court of Illinois
relied on the rule that a search of a person arrested for a traffic
violation is permissible where the officer has reason to believe he is
dealing not with the "ordinary traffic violator" but with a "criminal." Although the arresting officer had testified that defendant
gave him no cause for alarm, the court found the search legal because ". . . the absence of license plates suggests a serious violation
of the law which justifies a search."'"
Justice Goldenhersh, in his dissent, agreed with the opinion of the
appellate court, and indicated that because the record showed "conclusively that the search was made, not in connection with a custodial arrest, but during 'a routine traffic stop' "'3 and "at the time
of the search a custodial arrest had been neither made nor contemplated,"' 4 the reasonableness of the pat-down search must be judged
by the standards of Terry and Sibron. Since "a person would have
to be a 'genius' to traverse the highways without violating some
regulation of a state's motor vehicle code,"' 5 the Palmer decision
that motorists can be patted down without having been arrested and
without having given the police officer reason to fear for his safety
could have a wide-ranging effect.'
9. 414 U.S. at 236 n.6.
10. 62 Ill.
2d 261, 342 N.E.2d 353 (1976).
11. 22 Ill. App. 3d 866, 318 N.E.2d 206 (1st Dist. 1974).
12. 62 Ill.
2d 261, 263, 342 N.E.2d 353, 354.
13. Id. at 267, 342 N.E.2d at 356.
14. Id.
15. Comment, United States v. Robinson-Scope Incident to Custodial Arrest for a
Traffic Violation Defined, 35 U. OF Prrr. L. REv. 864, 876-77 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Scope Incident to CustodialArrest].
16. Every year millions of motorists are stopped for traffic violations. In 1973, for example,
there were 3,418,331 people "arrested" and issued citations for traffic violations in Chicago.
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This article discusses, in the context of Illinois law, the problem
of distinguishing between the traffic violator who is summarily arrested and taken into custody and the traffic violator who is temporarily detained while the police officer writes out a summons or
traffic ticket or issues a warning. It is submitted that the Illinois rule
which prohibits searches of "ordinary traffic violators" but permits
searches of "criminals" has no application to the summons situation
in which the police officer merely detains an individual for the
purpose of issuing a warning or a traffic ticket. Further, this situation is governed solely by Terry and Sibron. This article is not
intended as an exhaustive cataloguing of the pertinent cases. 7 However, it is hoped that the thoughts expressed herein will help avoid
a hasty and illogical application of the Robinson-Gustafson decisions and will contribute toward a rethinking of some of the problems involved in searches incident to traffic arrests or stops under
Illinois law. The Palmer case serves as the principal stimulus for
discussion.
People v. Palmer
On October 12, 1971, John Palmer stopped his car on Ogden
Avenue in Chicago at 11:10 a.m. in front of a doctor's office. Palmer
helped a lady with a baby from the car and then entered the car and
pulled away from the curb. A police officer observed that the car had
no rear state license plate, stopped the car and questioned Palmer.
Palmer was unable to produce a driver's license, but although appearing nervous, was completely cooperative, affording the officer
no undue cause to fear for his safety. While Palmer stood by his car
rifling his wallet in search of a "yellow slip" (presumably an official
temporary driver's license), the police officer made a "pat-down"
search of Palmer's person for weapons. In Palmer's rear pocket he
felt a metallic object. The officer then removed a pouch from Palmer's rear pocket which contained a .25 caliber pistol loaded with
four live cartridges. Palmer was arrested and charged with unlawful
use of weapons. A motion to suppress evidence was denied; Palmer
was found guilty and sentenced to serve 60 days in the House of
Correction.
Chicago Police Department Summary, item 11 (1973).
17. Even prior to the Robinson-Gustafson decisions, numerous other articles had been
written on the subject. The more thoughtful of these include: Simeone, Search and Seizure
Incident to Traffic Violations, 6 ST. Louis UNIV. L.J. 506 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Simeonel; Agata, Searches and Seizures Incident to Traffic Violations-A Reply to Professor
Simeone, 7 ST. Louis UNIV. L.J. 1 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Agatal; Korth, Search and
Seizure Incident to Traffic Violations, 4 WILLAMETTE L.J. 247 [hereinafter cited as Korth].
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The Appellate Court of Illinois reversed the conviction.'" The
court distinguished Robinson and Gustafson, relied upon by the
state, reasoning that those cases involved a valid custodial arrest
which was held to justify a warrantless search for any item. Since
the search in this case occurred prior to the arrest, the court held
that it must meet the standards of Terry v. Ohio'9 and Sibron v.
New York. 20 Further, the court held that the pat-down search was
unreasonable because the officer, by his own testimony, had no
reason to fear for his safety or believe that Palmer was armed and
dangerous:
. . .the mere facts that license plates were missing and that the
individual then cannot produce a driver's license or permit, without more, do not afford a reasonable basis for believing that the
individual is armed and dangerous, nor did the officer in fact so
believe. We emphasize that here the pat-down search came before
any arrest for the observed traffic violation or for the failure to
produce the driver's license. This fact, coupled with the absence
of facts warranting the officer reasonably to suspect that he was
2
in danger of attack, rendered the search improper. '
Although the majority did not approach the case as a "traffic"
case but adopted a traditional analysis, Justice Leighton filed a
special concurring opinion in which he pointed out that the case
involved "the most common kind of police-citizen confrontation in
our motorized society: the occasion when a peace officer has reason
to believe that a motorist has committed a minor traffic violation."2
The traffic violation which Palmer was suspected of committing was
punishable by a fine of not more than $100 or imprisonment for not
more than 10 days and was "an offense for which the law did not
require custodial arrest. 2 3 By a practice of long standing, Justice
Leighton observed, the police officer would ordinarily have issued
defendant a traffic ticket which is the equivalent of a civil summons.2 41 More important to Justice Leighton, however, was that the
police officer "had no intention of making an arrest. 2' 5 Justice
Leighton's conclusion was succinct:
For these reasons, I would emphasize that when a peace officer
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

22 I1. App. 3d 866, 318 N.E.2d 206 (1st Dist. 1974).
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
392 U.S. 40 (1968).
22 I1. App. 3d at 871, 318 N.E.2d at 210.
Id. at 872, 318 N.E.2d at 210..
Id. at 872, 318 N.E.2d at 211.
Id.
Id.
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stops a motorist for a traffic violation which does not require custodial arrest and the peace officer does not intend to make one, the
"pat-down," "frisk," search or touching of the motorist by the
officer is illegal, unless there is some act or conduct, or some fact
or circumstance which causes the peace officer reasonably to believe it necessary to "pat-down," "frisk," search or touch the
motorist in order to protect himself or those around him.2
In a brief opinion, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the motion to suppress was properly denied.2 7 Providing little
illumination, the court concluded that due to the absence of license
plates, the officer "was justified in believing that he was dealing
with something more than the routine traffic violator. 2' 8 The court
rejected defendant's characterization of the absence of license plates
as a "routine traffic violation" which did not in itself give rise to any
fact from which the officer could reasonably infer that defendant
was armed and dangerous with the observation that "the decisions
of this court have consistently held that the absence of license plates
2'
suggests a serious violation of the law which justifies a search."
The court then cited and relied upon three Illinois cases 30 which are
discussed later in this article.
Dissenting, Justice Goldenhersh distinguished the three cases relied upon by the majority and stated that "it is clear that in none
of the three cases upon which the majority relies were the arrest and
subsequent search approved solely on the basis of an absence of
license plates." 3 Justice Goldenhersh found no reason to distinguish
a misdemeanor committed by reason of the absence of license plates
from any other traffic violation and relied upon Justice Leighton's
observation that the offense of driving without license plates did not
require a custodial arrest.
However, the crux of his dissent was that no arrest had occurred
and therefore there could be no search unless Terry requirements
were met:
. . . the appellate court correctly concluded that in the circumstances shown by this record, where at the time of the search a
custodial arrest had been neither made nor contemplated, the police officer was in precisely the same position, so far as exposure
26. Id.
27. 62 I1. 2d 261, 342 N.E.2d 353 (1976).
28. Id. at 262, 342 N.E.2d at 354.
29. Id. at 263, 342 N.E.2d at 354.
30. People v. Berry, 17 Ill. 2d 247, 161 N.E.2d 315 (1959); People v. Watkins, 19 Ill. 2d
11, 166 N.E.2d 433 (1960); People v. Brown, 38 11. 2d 353, 231 N.E.2d 577 (1967).
31. 62 I1. 2d at 265, 342 N.E.2d at 355.
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to danger was concerned, as were the inquiring officers in Terry v.
Ohio and Sibron v. New York. The reasonableness of the search
in this case must be judged by the standards of Terry and Sibron,
and by those standards, under the circumstances which existed at
the time of the search, it was unreasonable."2
The majority opinion is unsatisfactory. The court did not discuss
the appellate court's application of Terry standards to what was
agreed to be a pre-arrest search. There is no discussion of why the
absence of license plates "justifies" a search. The search could not
be characterized as "incident" to an arrest because the search preceded the arrest. By use of the vague phrase "justifies a search" the
court avoided discussion of when the arrest occurred or whether the
search was incident to an arrest. Although the court cited and purported to rely on the general rule that a search is justified when the
officer believes he is dealing not with an oridinary traffic violator
but with a criminal, the court avoided detailing how the policeman
could conclude that Palmer was a "criminal." Finally, by summarily rejecting defendant's contention that the case involved a "routine" traffic violation, the court avoided any discussion of the common traffic stop situation in which a traffic ticket is issued.
Commentators have voiced the fear that the Robinson-Gustafson
decisions have potential for a wide-reaching impact on motorists.33
All persons who drive will probably at one time or another be
stopped for a suspected traffic violation. Whether or not a person is
arrested and thereby subjected to a full search depends upon the
whim of the police.34 The following discussion attempts to clarify the
Illinois Supreme Court's approach to the Palmer case by placing
Palmer in the context of this court's previous decisions.
Watkins AND ITS PROGENY
Prior to 1960, courts generally permitted a search of the person
32. Id. at 267, 342 N.E.2d at 356 (citations omitted).
33. See Nakell, supra note 4. See also Scope Incident to Custodial Arrest, supra note 15,
at 877; LaFave, "Case-by-CaseAdjudication" Versus "Standardized Procedures:" The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 Sup. CT. REv. 127 [hereinafter cited as LaFave]; Comment, Search
Incident to CustodialArrest For Traffic Violation, 12 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 401, 411-13 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as American Criminal Law Comment].
34. Amsterdam, Perspectives On The Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 416
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Amsterdam]:
It thereby held that whether you and I get arrested and subjected to a full-scale
body search or are sent upon our respective ways with a pink multiform and a
disapproving cluck when we happen to go for a drive and to leave our operators'
licenses on the dressing table depends upon the state of the digestion of any officer
who stops us-or, more likely, upon our obsequiousness, the price of our automobiles, the formality of our dress, the shortness of our hair or the color of our skin.
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and vehicle incident to an arrest for a traffic violation on the ground
that the search was incident to the arrest. 5 The reasoning of these
cases was simple and closely resembled the reasoning of Robinson
and Gustafson: if the arrest was legal, and the search was incident
to the arrest, the search was legal.
The law in Illinois was represented by People v. Clark3 and
People v. Berry37 the latter being one of the three cases recently
relied upon by the court in Palmer. In Berry, two Chicago police
officers, both members of the gambling detail, observed defendant
sitting in a car which bore neither state license plates nor a city
vehicle sticker. As the officers approached the car they observed a
man sitting in the passenger side of the car hand defendant a package of policy tickets, which defendant quickly placed in his pocket.
One police officer opened the car door, took the package from defendant's pocket and "told him he was under arrest for failure to have
the necessary automobile licenses and for possession of policy paraphernalia."3 A subsequent search of his person resulted in recovery
of additional policy tickets.
On appeal from a conviction for possession of policy paraphernalia, the Illinois Supreme Court observed that defendant "was required by law to register the vehicle with the Illinois Secretary of
State, and upon his failure to do so was subject to arrest." 9 Since
this violation was "clearly apparent to the police officers and continued in their presence, they were justified in making the arrest and
accompanying search without a warrant having previously been issued." 40 The court also held that the search was justified as incident
to an arrest for the wrongful possession of policy paraphernalia.
Both justifications for the search were predicated upon the existence
of a completed arrest to which the search was incident and the court
simply applied the prevailing rule which permitted a search incident to an arrest: "Where the arrest is justified, for what ever cause,
the accompanying search is also justified.""
35. See, e.g., People v. Clark, 9 Ill. 2d 400, 137 N.E.2d 820 (1956); People v. Berry, 17 Il.
2d 247, 161 N.E.2d 315 (1959). See generally Comment, Search of Motor Vehicle Incident To
A Traffic Arrest: The Outlook after Robinson and Gustafson, 36 OHIo ST. L.J. 97, 98-99 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Search of Motor Vehicle]; Simeone, supra note 17; Agata, supra note
17; Comment, Searches and Seizures Incident To Arrests for Minor Traffic Violations In
Illinois, 1960 U. ILL. L.F. 440 [hereinafter cited as Searches and Seizures].
36. 9 Il.2d 400, 137 N.E.2d 820 (1956).
37. 17 Ill.
2d 247, 161 N.E.2d 315 (1959).
38. Id. at 250, 161 N.E.2d at 317.
39. Id. at 251, 161 N.E.2d at 317.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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As pointed out by Justice Goldenhersh, Berry is certainly a different case from Palmer. The officers apparently had independent
probable cause to effect an arrest for the offense of possession of
policy slips, which is an offense for which a search might reasonably
be expected to yield fruits. Berry is not really a traffic offense case
and is scant authority for the search that occurred in Palmer. More
importantly, however, it is quite clear that in Berry defendant was
placed under custodial arrest-a fact which sharply distinguishes
Berry from the Palmer summons situation, but which was ignored
by the Illinois Supreme Court in Palmer.
Berry was partially overruled one year later by People v.
Watkins.2 Except for the nature of the traffic violation, the facts of
Watkins are virtually indistinguishable from those of Berry. In
Watkins members of the gambling detail observed defendant, who
had been arrested by them twice previously, park his car too close
to a cross-walk and enter a building. Defendant emerged 20 minutes
later, but ran back into the building when he saw the police officers.
Defendant was arrested and searched. The search resulted in the
recovery of policy slips, and defendant was convicted of possession
of policy slips.
On appeal defendant argued that the policy slips were obtained
by means of an unreasonable search and seizure. The state, in reliance on People v. Clark,4 3 argued that the search was valid on the
ground that the policy slips had been seized only after defendant
had been validly arrested for a parking violation. The court rejected
the state's position that there should be a "uniform rule permitting
a search in every case of a valid arrest" in favor of examining
*... the nature of the offense and the surrounding circumstances
to determine whether the search was warranted."' 4 The court observed that:
[a] search incident to an arrest is authorized when it is reasonably
necessary to protect the arresting officer from attack, to prevent
4
the prisoner from escaping, or to discover fruits of a crime. 1
Although it was noted that "some traffic violations would justify
a search," the court held that the parking violation which occurred
in this case would not support a search, and overruled Clark and
Berry to the extent that they were inconsistent with these views.
The court also gratuitously observed that "[tihe total absence of
42.
43.
44.
45.

19 Ill. 2d 11,
9 I1. 2d 400,
19 Ill. 2d 11,
Id. at 18-19,

166
137
18,
166

N.E.2d 433 (1960).
N.E.2d 820 (1956).
166 N.E.2d 433, 437 (1960).
N.E.2d at 437.
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license plates, for example, as in People v. Berry, could reasonably
suggest a serious violation of the law. . ."" but did not enlighten
us with its reasoning, which presumably led Justice Goldenhersh to
observe in dissent in Palmer that "[t]he opinion fails to state why
this is so.""
The Watkins Court then went on to hold that the search like the
search in Berry, could be justified on other grounds. The fact that
the officers knew defendant and had arrested him before, along with
the fact that he ran back into the building when he saw them, made
it reasonable for the police to assume that "they were dealing with
a situation more serious than a routine parking violation."4 In
People v. Mayo,49 the Illinois Supreme Court applied the same standard to searches of the vehicle of the traffic violator.
The Watkins case was widely received as establishing a new rule
limiting searches incident to arrests for traffic violations.50 After the
decision in Watkins "[a]n increasing number of state courts and
numerous federal courts of appeal began to follow the lead of the
Illinois Supreme Court, viewing searches based only upon a traffic
5
arrest as constitutionally prohibited general exploratory searches." '
Watkins became the leading case and the rule first expressed in
Watkins came to be accepted by so many courts that in 1971 the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia stated:

[t]he vast majority of courts-both state and federal-which have
considered the problem hold specifically that absent "special circumstances," a police officer has no right to search either the person or the vehicle incident to a lawful arrest for violation of a mere
motor vehicle regulation."52
The Illinois statement of the rule is that the search is not permitted
incident to an arrest for a traffic violation unless "circumstances
46. Id. (citation omitted).
47. 62 Ill.
2d 263, 265, 342 N.E.2d 353, 355 (1976).
48. 19 Ill.
2d at 19, 166 N.E.2d at 437.
49. 19 I1. 2d 136, 166 N.E.2d 440 (1960).
50. The case was discussed in Simeone, supra note 17 and Agata, supra note 17. See also
Searches and Seizures, supra note 35. The historical role of the Watkins and Mayo cases is
discussed in Search of a Motor Vehicle, supra note 35.
51. Search of a Motor Vehicle, supra note 46, at 100.
52. United States v. Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082, 1103-04 (D.C. Cir. 1972). A commentator
has observed that:
Special circumstances may include new information which is discovered after the
vehicle is stopped, suspicious movements by one of the car's occupants providing
probable cause to arrest for some other crime, or additional knowledge that the
officer already has in his possession linking the driver or passengers with other
crimes.
American Criminal Law Comment, supra note 33, at 804 n.15.
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reasonably indicate that the police may be dealing not with the
53
ordinary traffic violator, but with a criminal.
The Watkins rule and subsequent distinction between "ordinary
traffic violators" and "criminals" originated in the context of a
custodial arrest and was intended as a limitation on the right of the
police to search incident to a custodial arrest. In both Berry and
Watkins the defendant had been arrested before he was searched.
The rule was never intended to apply to the situation where the
traffic offender is briefly detained while the police write out a traffic
ticket and then allow him to proceed. The distinction between custodial arrests and brief detentions for issuance of a traffic ticket,
however, was unrecognized by the Illinois Supreme Court in the
subsequent cases. In addition to avoiding discussion of whether a
custodial arrest had been effected, the Illinois Supreme Court
avoided a traditional probable cause analysis 4 and came to rely
more and more on the distinction between "ordinary traffic violators" and "criminals."
For example, in People v. Zeravich,5 defendant was stopped at
4:50 a.m. as he left a private parking lot behind a building. After
defendant produced his driver's license and evidence of ownership
of the vehicle, he was issued a citation for driving with obstructed
vision. The officers then noticed that defendant's clothing matched
that of the description of a suspect wanted in connection with several crimes in the area. Defendant was searched and at trial sought
to suppress a sum of money recovered in the search. In upholding
the search, the supreme court relied upon the Watkins rule that
"every arrest for a traffic violation does not automatically justify a
search of the arrested person, 56 but held that the police officers had
reasonably concluded they might be "facing not just a traffic law
violator, but a dangerous criminal. ' 57 Although in Zeravich the police had merely stopped defendant and issued a traffic citation at
the time he was searched, the supreme court treated the case as if
the search were incident to an arrest and failed to mention whether
an arrest had occurred at the time of the search. Although the arrest
and search in Zeravich were certainly supported by probable cause,
the supreme court chose to characterize the case in terms of the
53. People v. Tate, 38 IIl. 2d 184, 188, 230 N.E.2d 697, 699 (1967).
54. In at least one case decided after Watkins the Illinois Supreme Court analyzed the
facts to determine whether there was probable cause in the traditional sense for the search
of the car. People v. Georgev, 38 Ill.
2d 165, 230 N.E.2d 851 (1967).
55. 30 Ill. 2d 275, 195 N.E.2d 612 (1964).
56. Id. at 277, 195 N.E.2d at 613.
57. Id.
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distinction between "traffic violators" and "criminals" rather than
simply finding probable cause to arrest quite apart from the existence of a traffic violation.
People v. Thomas,5' like Watkins, is a case in which defendant
was first arrested for a traffic violation and then searched. In
Thomas, defendant was stopped at 5:00 a.m. because one or both
of his taillights were not operating. When asked for his driver's
license, he replied that he had just gotten out of jail and did not
have one; the police then arrested defendant and searched his person and the automobile. He was convicted of possession of narcotic
drugs recovered from defendant's person and the car. Thomas was
clearly in custody at the time of the search and the court relied upon
Watkins and Mayo for the rule that not every traffic violation authorizes a search, but that the police may search when circumstances reasonably indicate that they are dealing not with the ordinary
traffic violator, but with a criminal. The court stated that this holding
is based on the proposition that a search incident to an arrest is
authorized only when it is reasonably necessary to protect the arresting officer from attack, to prevent the prisoner from escaping
or to discover fruits of the crime . . . none of these circumstances
is present in the case of most traffic violations.59
The court continued, on the authority of Watkins and Zeravich,
that "the police officers were justified in searching defendant and
the area under the front seat for their own protection before taking
him to the police station for the traffic offenses." 60
The following year, in People v. Davis,6 the court again had occasion to apply the Watkins rule. Davis was "arrested" at 1:20 a.m.
for making an improper left turn and driving without a light on his
rear license plate. The officer who stopped the car asked for Davis'
license and informed him of the violations. When Davis emerged
from the car, the officer observed a tinfoil package on the floor of
the driver's side of the car. The officer opened the tinfoil package,
found white powder and placed defendant under arrest and
searched the car. The search led to recovery of another tinfoil package.
58. 31 111. 2d 212, 201 N.E.2d 413 (1964).
59. Id. at 213, 201 N.E.2d at 414.
60. Id. at 214, 201 N.E.2d at 414. There was no indication, however, that the police
intended to permit Thomas to drive his car to the police station, so it is difficult to see how
the police needed the protection afforded by a search of the car.
61. 33 Ill. 2d 134, 210 N.E.2d 530 (1965).
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The court held that this search was justified under Thomas because the circumstances indicated that the police were dealing not
with the ordinary traffic violator but with a criminal. Although
there was no discussion of the issue, the court's comments are unclear as to when the arrest occurred. Early in its opinion the court
stated that defendant was "arrested" for the two traffic violations,
but later the court twice stated that defendant was not arrested
until after discovery of the white powder in the first tinfoil package:
"It was only then that the defendant was placed under arrest and
the car was searched and the other tinfoil package found in the
crack of the front seat.""2 In any event, the case apparently did not
turn upon the question of when the arrest occurred and the search
was justified as incident to a custodial arrest.
Two years later the court decided People v. Brown, 3 another case
relied upon in Palmer. Brown was stopped at 1:30 a.m. because his
car had no license plates. Upon questioning, Brown admitted that
he had neither plates nor city sticker and was unable to produce a
driver's license. He explained that he had just come from a used car
lot where he had purchased the car and showed the police a title
made out to the dealer from whom Brown had allegedly purchased
the car, but which was not dated or signed and did not contain
Brown's name. An individual who was asleep in the back seat of
Brown's car told the police a different story. A search of the trunk
of the car lead to recovery of items which Brown sought to suppress
at trial.
In upholding the search, the court stated that "the total absence
of license plates on a car could reasonably suggest a serious violation
of the law which would justify a search." 4 Defendants admitted on
appeal, however, that the police were justified in suspecting that
they were not dealing with a mere traffic violator, but argued that
the circumstances did not justify the search of the trunk of the car
without a search warrant. The court disagreed and held the search
valid. That the court in Palmer relied so heavily on Brown, (which
involved the search of the trunk of the car) to justify a pat-down
search of the driver, indicates that the Court is more concerned with
the nature of the traffic violation than with the time or scope of the
search."
62. Id. at 138, 210 N.E.2d at 532.
63. 38 I1. 2d 353, 231 N.E.2d 577 (1967).
64. Id. at 355, 231 N.E.2d at 578.
65. In Brown the court refused to follow the earlier case of People v. Lewis, 34 Ill. 2d 211,
215 N.E.2d 283 (1966), which held that the search of the car was unreasonable where the
driver had already been placed in custody. In People v. Jones, 38 Ill. 2d 427, 231 N.E.2d 580
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In Palmer, Justice Goldenhersh found it difficult to perceive that
Brown provided authority for the search in Palmer, noting that in
Brown the court concluded that the officers had valid reason to
suspect that the automobile was stolen." No such facts existed in
Palmer and the court did not even suggest that there was probable
cause to believe that the car was stolen. Moreover, since Brown
dealt with the warrantless search of the trunk of the car, not a patdown search of the driver as in Palmer, the only real similarity
between Brown and Palmer was the absence of license plates, and
it was upon this single fact that Palmer was decided. In Brown,
however, the driver not only had no license plates, but also no
sticker, no driver's license and a title made out to a dealer where
he claimed he purchased the car. The facts of Brown, therefore,
arouse more suspicion that those of Palmer.
If the total absence of license plates justifies a search, the court
has also held that one absent license plate, even where the driver
exhibited "nervous behavior," does not justify a search. In People
v. Reed, 7 defendant was stopped around noon for driving without a
rear license plate. Reed did produce a valid driver's license and
registration card showing he had purchased both front and rear
plates. The officers testified that Reed behaved in a nervous fashion
and kept looking towards his car. The officers asked if he had any
weapons and when he replied negatively they searched him, but
found nothing. Still suspicious, the officers decided to take defendant to the police station in order to "check him out." 6 Before
taking defendant in, however, the police searched his car and found
a bag of white powder later determined to contain heroin.
The court reviewed the Watkins, Zeravich and Thomas cases and
concluded that the search was not justified. The court stated that
although defendant was stopped for driving without a rear license
plate, the stop was in broad daylight and defendant had valid identification for both himself and his automobile. He neither threatened the arresting officer, used loud language or attempted to escape, and the arresting officer admitted that the sole reason for the
search of defendant and his automobile was his nervous behavior.
After noting that "the total absence of license plates could reasonable suggest a serious violation of the law for which a search could
(1967), decided during the same term as Brown, Lewis was expressly overruled. The Lewis
case seems to have been the only attempt by the Illinois Supreme Court to limit the scope of
a search incident to an arrest for a traffic violation.
66. 62 Ill. 2d 261, 263, 342 N.E.2d 353, 355 (1976).
67. 37 Ill. 2d 91, 227 N.E.2d 69 (1967).
68. Id. at 92-93, 227 N.E.2d at 70.
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be made," the Court distinguished Berry on the grounds that "[in
the Berry case the defendants had neither front nor rear license
plates nor a city vehicle sticker."69 In contrast, Reed was missing
only the rear plate and had a registration card to show that his car
had been properly registered with the Secretary of State.
Several observations about the Watkins rule deserve mention.
First, in Watkins the court rejected a "uniform rule permitting a
search in every case of a valid arrest" in favor of a case-by-case
approach based upon the "nature of the offense and the surrounding
circumstances."7' The court also stated the rule that "[a] search
incident to an arrest is authorized when it is reasonably necessary
to protect the arresting officer from attack, to prevent the prisoner
from escaping, or to discover fruits of a crime."'" In Palmer, however, although it was agreed that the officer was not in fear of attack,
the court ignored the "surrounding circumstances" in favor of an
approach which focused wholly on the nature of the violation. The
court could point to no facts which indicated that the officer was
even remotely in danger of attack or that Palmer might try to escape. Further, there is no suggestion that there were any fruits of
the crime for which the officer was searching. Although the court in
Watkins purported to reject a "uniform rule", the court's obsession
with the absence of license plates has now created a uniform rule
that searches of the driver and vehicle may be made whenever it
appears that there is a total absence of license plates.
It is not clear, however, whether the offense of driving without
license plates is so qualitatively different from other traffic offenses
as to justify a search, or whether the absence of license plates is in
itself and without more, probable cause to believe that some other
crime, such as auto theft, has been committed."
The rejection of the court in Palmerof defendant's characterization of his conduct as a "routine traffic violation" and application
of the rule that the total absence of license plates "justifies a
69. Id. at 94, 227 N.E.2d at 71.
70. 19 Il. 2d 11, 18, 166 N.E.2d 433, 437 (1960). The surrounding circumstances or special
circumstances approach is discussed in United States v. Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082, 1103-04
(D.C. Cir. 1972). Numerous cases, including Watkins, illustrating application of the rule are
cited.
71. 19 Ill.
2d at 18-19, 166 N.E.2d at 437.
72. The California Supreme Court has concluded that the lack of license plates is not
probable cause to believe a car is stolen, but "when an officer stops a vehicle with missing or
improperly attached license plates and in addition learns the motorist is unable to produce
the registration card, he may reasonably entertain the belief that the vehicle is stolen."
People v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 7 Cal. 3d 186, 197, 496 P.2d 1205, 1212, 101
Cal. Rptr. 837, 844 (1972).
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search" leads to the conclusion that the court found the officer
justified in believing that he was dealing with a "criminal." But
what "crime" was Palmer suspected of having committed? To paraphrase Justice Stewart, is the absence of license plates "a talisman
in whose presence the fourth amendment fades away and disappears?"73
Second, the Illinois Supreme Court has neither defined nor given
body to the rather vague terms "ordinary traffic violator" and
"criminal". One interpretation, of course, is that the "ordinary
traffic violator" is a person who has merely violated the traffic or
motor vehicle laws, but creates no suspicion of having committed
any more serious crime such as auto theft, burglary, and the like,
whereas a "criminal" is a person for whom there is probable cause
to arrest. But the supreme court has avoided the traditional probable cause test in traffic cases in favor of the nebulous "special circumstances" test which more often than not results in searches
predicated upon "something less than the probable cause required
to support a search not incident to an arrest."74
Since there is already some "probable cause" involved in the
traffic violation, the argument may be that it takes only a little
more to "justify" a search. In other words, the "special circumstances" need not constitute independent probable cause, but need only
amount to strong reason to suspect. But what part of probable cause
is supplied by an improper left turn? Admittedly there may be
unusual circumstances where a driver attempts to escape, giving
rise to a high speed chase, or where driving is very erratic, which
may, without more, give rise to facts which support at least a patdown search. Another exception, of course, occurs where there is
reasonable cause to believe that the driver is intoxicated.75
73. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 461-62 (1971).
74. Note, Search Incident To Traffic Arrest: The Robinson-Gustafson Reasonable Per Se
Rule, 10 TuLSA L.J. 256, 263 (1975). Compare the approach of the Illinois Supreme Court in
People v. Zeravich, 30 Il. 2d 275, 195 N.E.2d 612 (1964) with the approach of the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals in Brown v. United States, 365 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1966), where
although the initial stop was for a traffic violation, the driver fit the description of a person
wanted for a robbery. The Illinois court in Zeravich treated the case as a traffic case involving
additional circumstances, whereas the court of appeals considered whether there was probable cause to arrest on the robbery charge.
75. See, e.g., Wellman v. United States, 414 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1969), where police observed driver tailgating another vehicle, weaving from side to side and speeding. When
stopped, the driver smelled strongly of alcohol and his speech was slightly slurred. The court
found "a search of the vehicle for further evidence of driving while under the influence of
intoxicants was reasonable and permissible." Id. at 265; People v. Epperly, 33 I1. App. 3d
886, 338 N.E.2d 581 (2d Dist. 1975) (wavering on highway and inability to produce driver's
license supported inspection of vehicle to ascertain registration and search for evidence of
liquor which could account for erratic driving).
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At least one other court has stated a rule which recognizes that
the existence of a traffic violation is not a substitute for probable
cause for a search. Speaking of searches following minor traffic violations, Judge Murrah of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals stated:
"[s]uch searches can only be justified in exceptional, on the spot
circumstances which rise to the dignity of probable cause."7
Third, the Illinois Supreme Court apparently recognizes no distinction between searches of the person and searches of the vehicle.
Although in one case the Illinois Supreme Court did hold that a car
search incident to an arrest for a traffic violation exceeded the permissible scope of the search,77 that case was overruled the following
year.7" The rule now recognizes no distinction and holds that whenever circumstances indicate that the police are dealing with a
"criminal," a search of the person and vehicle is justified.7 9
Fourth, unlike other courts, the Illinois Supreme Court has apparently recognized no limitation on the scope of a search incident to
an arrest for a traffic violation. Although perhaps this is no longer
important after Robinson and Gustafson, it does show the simplicity
of the Illinois distinction between "ordinary traffic violators" and
"criminals." Although after Watkins was decided, other jurisdictions"' adopted a rule permitting a limited pat-down search of persons arrested for traffic violations but prohibiting a general exploratory search, Illinois remained committed to the all-or-nothing approach represented by the distinction between ordinary traffic violators and criminals." The former could not be searched at all and
there was no scope limitation on a search of the latter.
Finally, in applying the Watkins rule, the Illinois Supreme Court
has placed no significance upon whether an arrest has actually occurred at the time of the search. In Reed the defendant was actually
subjected to a custodial arrest, but the search was held illegal. In
Zeravich the search may have preceded the arrest, but was upheld
without any discussion of when the arrest occurred.
Elsewhere the court has stated explicitly what has apparently
been assumed in the traffic search cases that:
76. United States v. Humphrey, 409 F.2d 1055, 1058 (10th Cir. 1969).
77. People v. Lewis, 34 Ill. 2d 211, 213 N.E.2d 516 (1966).
78. People v. Jones, 38 Il. 2d 427, 231 N.E.2d 580 (1967); People v. Brown, 38 111. 2d 353,
231 N.E.2d 577 (1967).
79. People v. Brown, 38 Ill. 2d 353, 231 N.E.2d 577 (1967).
80. See, e.g., Barnes v. State, 25 Wis. 2d 116, 130 N.W.2d 264 (1964) (search of pocket of
driver resulting in recovery of narcotics held to exceed scope of permissible search).
81. See, e.g., People v. Thomas, 31 111. 2d 212, 201 N.E.2d 413 (1964) (search resulting in
recovery of narcotics from defendant's person and automobile held reasonable).
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• . .it
is the reasonableness of the search, whether it applies to the
person or vehicle, which is of primary importance and not whether
the search occurred before or after the defendant was arrested and
taken into custody.s2
In upholding a search predicated upon an anonymous informant's
tip that defendant had a gun, the court stated that it was not "concerned in this case with whether there had or had not technically
8' 3
been an arrest when the defendant was searched.
The Illinois Supreme Court has avoided discussion of when arrest
occurs or whether, in particular circumstances, the search precedes
the arrest; the assumption seems to be either that the stop itself
constitutes the "arrest" or that the point of arrest is simply irrelevant.
Nowhere is the court's refusal to confront this issue more apparent than in the recent Palmer decision. The appellate court found
and the state agreed that the pat-down search preceded the arrest.
Defendant maintained that the case presented only a question of
whether the pat-down search was legal under Terry standards, but
the majority ignored this argument in favor of its oft-repeated statement, originating in Watkins, that the total absence of license
plates justifies a search. Apparently, the court applied Watkins to
a situation for which the rule was never intended. The traffic violation in Palmerwas a "routine traffic violation" because, as Justices
Leighton and Goldenhersh observed, it would ordinarily have been
handled by issuance of a traffic summons or ticket rather than by a
full custodial arrest of the driver. Justice Goldenhersh stated in his
dissent that the record showed "conclusively that the search was
made, not in connection with a custodial arrest, but during a 'routine traffic stop' "84 where the officer would simply issue a citation
and allow the offender to proceed.
Justice Goldenhersh also rejected reliance on the nature of the
traffic offense and pointed out that "an examination of the authorities fails to support drawing a distinction between a misdemeanor
committed by reason of failure to display license plates and other
traffic violations." 5 A person stopped for driving without license
plates or evidence of registration of a motor vehicle 6 has the option
82. People v. Pickett, 39 Ill.
2d 88, 93, 233 N.E.2d 560, 563 (1968).
83. In re Boykin, 39 Il. 2d 617, 619-20, 237 N.E.2d 460, 462 (1968). These statements of
the rule in Pickett and Boykin seem inconsistent with the Supreme Court's position in Rios
v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960) and Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959). See
text accompanying notes 94 through 101 infra.
84. 62 IlI. 2d 261, 267, 342 N.E.2d 353, 356 (1976).
85. Id.
86. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95'2, § 3-701 (1975).
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of depositing his driver's license with the officer demanding bail in
lieu of other security27 Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule, he could
also post an approved bail bond certificate or $25 cash.88
In the routine traffic stop situation the driver will be allowed to
proceed if he surrenders his driver's license or a bail bond card. In
the event that the driver wishes to post a cash bail, however, he
must go to the police station. Does the driver's preference for posting
cash bail- justify a search? The appellate court has suggested that
no such search is permitted merely because the traffic violator
8
chooses to post bail at the police station. In People v. Jordan,"
defendant was stopped for making an illegal left turn. The driver
had no driver's license but was driving on a prior driving citation,
an accepted procedure in Illinois. The police officer conducted a
pat-down search and discovered a small vial of pills which proved
to be depressant drugs. During a hearing on a motion to suppress
the trial court refused to permit defense counsel to prove that the
police officer permitted defendant to drive his own car to the police
station to post bond. In an opinion by Justice Egan, the appellate
court held that the search exceeded the permissible scope of a reasonable search under the circumstances, and discussed without deciding whether the officer had any right to conduct a search at all.
With reference to the trial court's refusal to allow defense counsel
to show that the defendant was permitted to drive his own car to
the station, the court noted:
If that position is correct, in every case where a motorist does not
wish to surrender his driver's license after a traffic violation but
wishes to post a bond at the station, or whenever a motorist does
not have his driver's license, the police are justified in searching
him. Such a holding flies in the face of the clear meaning of
Watkins. If the police did not intend to convey the defendant in a
police vehicle, what would be the basis of their right to search? A
failure to have a driver's license or a preference to posting a bond
rather than surrendering the license are not such facts, standing
alone, that reasonably indicate to an officer that he may be in
danger of an attack. 0
Although after Robinson and Gustafson the Jordan case is dubious authority on the scope of the search issue, the court's observations on whether a search was permissible at all remain highly perti87.
88.
89.
90.

ILL. REv. STAT.
ILL. REV. STAT.
11 Ill.
App. 3d
Id. at 486, 297

ch. 951", § 6-306 (1975).
ch. 110A, § 526 (1975).
482, 297 N.E.2d 273 (1st Dist. 1973).
N.E.2d at 276.
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nent. The court clearly suggested that unless there is a custodial
arrest, no search is permissible, even where the traffic offender does
not post his driver's license, but is permitted to drive to the station
to post bail. The observation that a search of a traffic violator who
wishes to post bond rather than surrender his driver's license "flies
in the face of the clear meaning of Watkins" lends additional support to the opinions of the appellate court and Mr. Justice Goldenhersh in Palmer.
In sum, the Illinois Supreme Court has allowed Watkins, once a
leading case, to atrophy by failure to keep pace with developments
since Watkins in other states. What was a good idea in Watkins has
been allowed to degenerate into an unworkable and essentially
subjective distinction between "ordinary traffic violators" and
"criminals." This distinction which was developed to limit police
searches of persons subjected to custodial arrests has been rendered
obsolete by the United States Supreme Court's decisions in
Robinson and Gustafson. The rule was never intended to apply to
traffic stops where custodial arrest neither occurs nor is contemplated by the officer, and should not be transplanted to justify
searches of motorists without probable cause in the summons situation.
THE IMPORTANCE OF WHEN THE ARREST OCCURS

In contrast to the approach adopted by the Illinois Supreme Court
in Palmer, the appellate court did not cite Watkins or any of the
other Illinois traffic search cases, but decided the case on the basis
of a more traditional application of fourth amendment principles.
Rather than focusing, as the supreme court did, on the nature of the
traffic violation, the appellate court looked to the facts to determine
the point in time at which the arrest occurred and concluded that
the search preceded the arrest and was therefore illegal"
Since the usual justification for a warrantless search of a person
or vehicle is that it is incident to an arrest, defense counsel have
commonly attempted to show either that the search in fact preceded
the arrest, or that the arrest was not based upon probable cause and
the resulting search incident to the arrest was therefore illegal. Depending upon which of these approaches is best suited to the facts
of a given case, counsel attempt, during the hearing on a motion to
suppress, to fix the point of arrest early or late in the encounter
91. "It is axiomatic that an incident search may not precede an arrest and serve as part
of its justification." Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 63 (1968).

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 7

between the citizen and the police.12 If the arrest occurred early and
the search quite obviously followed, defense counsel would try to
show that the police officers had acted too quickly in effecting an
arrest actually based upon mere suspicion which had not ripened
into probable cause. On the other hand, if the search occurred early
in the encounter, defense counsel would attetmpt to demonstrate
that the search preceded the arrest and was therefore illegal. When
the search was substantially contemporaneous with the arrest and
based upon probable cause, the courts sometimes upheld the search
even if it did precede the arrest in point of time. 3 The situations
were usually complicated in that during the encounter the police
officer was learning more and more about the citizen and becoming
more suspicious, making it difficult to determine when his suspicions ripened to probable cause justifying the search.
The above rules have been applied to car stops with differing
results. For example, in Rios v. United States,94 a police officer
alighted from his police car and arrested a passenger in a taxicab
stopped for a traffic light. The passenger was prosecuted for possession of narcotics contained in a package which the police officer
testified was dropped to the floor of the taxicab by petitioner. It was
conceded by the government that the officers had no probable cause
to arrest at the time that the officers alighted from their car and
approached the taxicab in which petitioner was riding. In that posture of the case, the Court observed that if, as petitioner had contended, the arrest occurred when the officers took their positions at
the doors of the taxicab, then nothing which happened thereafter
could have made the arrest lawful or justified the search as incident
to the arrest. 5 If, on the other hand, as the government argued, the
policeman approached the taxi "only for the purpose of routine
interrogation, and . . . had no intent to detain the petitioner beyond the momentary requirements of such a mission," 9 and petitioner then voluntarily revealed the narcotics, the arrest would have
been supported by probable cause. Since the "validity of the search
thus turns upon the narrow question of when the arrest occurred,"97
the court remanded the case to the district court to determine thiA
question.
92. "It is a question of fact precisely when, in each case, the arrest took place." Id. at 67.
93. Busby v. United States, 296 F.2d 328, 332 (9th Cir. 1961); United States v. Jenkins,
496 F.2d 57, 73 (2d Cir. 1974).
94. 364 U.S. 253 (1960).
95. Id. at 261-62.
96. Id. at 262.
97. Id.
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In Henry v. United States," the Court held that the arrest of two
suspects by FBI agents occurred when the car in which they were
riding was stopped and that what the agents saw after the stop was
irrelevant to the issue of probable cause and could not be used to
justify the arrest and search. Although the government conceded
that the arrest took place when the federal agents stopped the car,
the Court added that the arrest was complete "when the officers
interrupted the two men and restricted their liberty of movement. . .. "' Applying the principle that "an arrest is not justified
by what the subsequent search discloses," the Court observed that
"[w]hat transpired at or after the time the car was stopped by the
officers" was irrelevant to the determination of whether or not the
officers had probable cause for the arrest. 00
Although some courts have followed the Henry rule that an arrest
occurs at the moment a car is stopped, 0' other courts apparently
found the principle too limiting and looked instead to what occurred
after the stop to determine the precise point of arrest. 02 For example, in Busby v. United States,0° a San Francisco police officer
following a suspicious car stopped the car when he noticed that the
light over the license plate was nonfunctional. The police officer
ordered the driver and the two passengers out of the car and observed by means of the dome light a sawed-off shotgun partially
concealed under the rear seat. On appeal from a federal prosecution
for possession of an unregistered firearm, the court of appeals, citing
Rios, undertook to determine the time at which the arrest was made
and held that under California law there had been no arrest prior
to discovery of the shotgun because "[n]o one had been taken into
custody in this case until after the shotgun which gave rise to probable cause was seen."'0 4 In emphasizing that an arrest is "a taking of
person into custody" under California law, the court held that
"there was no arrest or search when Officer Ryden stopped the car
after seeing a violation of the California Vehicle Code."''0 Although
this result seems diametrically opposed to the Henry decision, the
court distinguished Henry on the grounds that in that case the
98. 361 U.S. 98 (1959).
99. Id. at 103.
100. Id. at 104.
101. United States v. Burhannon, 388 F.2d 961 (7th Cir. 1968).
102. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 452 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1971).
103. 296 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1961).
104. Id. at 331.
105. Id. The court apparently applied the principle that the validity of the arrest by
local officials will be determined by reference to state law in the absence of an applicable
federal statute. See United States v. DeRe, 333 U.S. 581 (1948).
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prosecution had conceded that the arrest had taken place when the
car was stopped. 00
Examples of cases in which the issue of whether the stop of a car
was an arrest was raised are legion.'"7 A principle which may explain
many cases is that the stop of a car is more likely to be viewed as
an arrest when the stop is not for a traffic violation, but for the
purpose of effecting custodial arrest of the driver for an offense other
than a traffic violation. This reasoning would explain the different
results in Henry, Burhannon and Busby' and probably results in
numerous other cases as well. Since courts tend to look to the nature
and purpose of the detention in determining whether the search was
justified,'0 9 it is not surprising that the courts have concluded that
some stops are "arrests" whereas others are not. In this context use
of the term "arrest" is a conclusion used to support the result that
the search was either incident or not incident to an "arrest."
More recent cases holding that the stop of a car is not an "arrest"
have relied upon the "investigatory stop" concept of Terry and
Sibron, which have been interpreted to permit a "forcible stop"
based upon less than probable cause to arrest." Following the decisions in Terry and Sibron, lower courts were quick to apply the
concept of the "investigatory stop" to the stop of a motor vehicle
based on less than probable cause. In a case where strict application
of the Henry rule might have resulted in suppression of the evidence
seized, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the fourth
amendment permitted "stopping the suspicious-acting car and detaining the car and its occupants for brief questioning."' The court
relied on Terry for the observation that a "stop is to be distinguished
from an arrest requiring probable cause,"" 2 and concluded that although there was no probable cause for arrest, the stop of the car
106. 296 F.2d at 332.
107. See, e.g., People v. Colon, 9 Il. App. 3d 989, 293 N.E.2d 468 (1st Dist. 1973), where
the court held that the curbing of a car is not an arrest of the driver.
108. In both Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959), and Burhannon v. United States,
398 F.2d 961 (7th Cir. 1968), the arrest was made by federal agents for a federal crime and
there was no suggestion of a traffic violation. Both arrests were held invalid because ther#
was no probable cause to arrest when the car was stopped. In contrast, in Busby v. United
States, 296 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1961), the car was initially stopped for a traffic violation and
the arrest, based upon what occurred thereafter, was held invalid.
109. This approach also permits some check on the vast possibilities for abuse in arrests
for traffic violations. See Amador-Gonzales v. United States, 391 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1968)
(arrest of narcotics suspect by narcotics agents for a traffic violation held illegal as a pretext
for a search).
110. The term "forcible stop" was used in Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
111. Young v. United States, 435 F.2d 405, 408 (9th Cir. 1970).
112. Id. at 408.
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was justified by facts which reasonably warranted the intrusion.
Professor Amsterdam, reading Rios, Henry and Terry together,
has defined an arrest as "any restriction of a citizen's liberty which
3
is more than brief."1
In any event, the point is that in Palmer the appellate court
followed a well-recognized approach to determine when the arrest
occurred and applied the rule that a search which precedes the
arrest and is otherwise not supported by probable cause or reasonable grounds to believe the person searched is armed apd dangerous
is illegal under the fourth amendment. Implicit in the Palmer opinion is the premise that the stop of the car did not constitute an
arrest, but this assumption was not stated by the court. The search
in Palmer so obviously preceded the arrest that the appellate court
did not discuss the problem.
In this context, however, one further point must be made. The
conclusion in Palmer that the search was illegal because it preceded
the arrest must be read with Justice Leighton's observation that the
officer had no intention of making an arrest until the search resulted
in recovery of a weapon. This view of the case explains why the
search is not governed by the rule that a search may precede the
arrest if it is substantially contemporaneous with the arrest. This
doctrine is, of course, applicable where the officer has probable
cause and intends to effect an arrest, but it should be inapplicable
where there is no intention to effect an arrest, as in the routine
traffic stop situation. The decision of the appellate court in Palmer
was therefore correct, not only because the search preceded the
arrest, but also because no arrest was contemplated at the time of
the search; under those circumstances, the appellate court correctly
concluded that the search must be evaluated under Terry standards. 1"
SUMMONS V. SUMMARY ARREST

The Palmer case involved "the most common kind of policecitizen confrontation in our motorized society." ' 15 Recognizing
this, Justice Leighton observed that not only did the search precede the arrest, as held by the majority, but the stop was "for an
offense for which the law did not require a custodial arrest" and in
fact the policy officer "had no intention of making an arrest." 6
113. Amsterdam, supra note 34, at 453 n.217.
114. For discussion of the application of Terry standards to the traffic stop situation by
other courts, see text accompanying notes 147 through 177 in/ra.
115. 23 Il.App. 3d at 79, 318 N.E.2d at 210.
116. Id. at 81, 318 N.E.2d at 211.
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Reasoning one step further, Justice Leighton distinguished a situation involving a summary custodial arrest from a situation in which
the traffic offender is merely issued a traffic ticket or summons,
thereby focusing upon a distinction totally blurred by the Illinois
Supreme Court's decisions in Watkins and subsequent cases. While
this distinction may have been unimportant prior to the RobinsonGustafson decisions because of the Illinois rule limiting searches
even after custodial arrests for traffic violations, its importance in
the wake of those decisions has been recognized." 7
Failure of the court in Watkins and subsequent cases"" to distinguish between alternative actions taken by police officers where a
motorist is stopped for a traffic violation in part results because
each of these alternatives is frequently termed an "arrest.""' 9 But
very different types of "arrests" are involved.
First, in the summons situation, the traffic offender is stopped,
briefly detained and allowed to proceed with a warning or is issued
a traffic ticket or citation, similar to a civil summons or notice to
appear in court. In Illinois, this situation is frequently accompanied
by surrender of the driver's license or a bond card.
Second, in the summary arrest situation, the policeman places
the traffic violator under arrest and takes him into custody for the
purpose of taking him to the police station in the police car or
vehicle. The arrest may be for the traffic violation alone or for another observed offense.
Third, the traffic offender may be directed to follow the police car
to the station, where he is allowed to post bond. This situation
117. See Caruso, After United States v. Robinson: Effect on New York Law, 39 ALBANY
L. REV. 895, 909-10 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Effect on New York Law].
The Illinois Supreme Court's failure to distinguish between situations in which a traffic
violator is summarily arrested and taken into custody and situations in which a traffic
citation is issued has been previously noted. In an article which appeared two years after
Watkins and before many of the subsequent cases, Professor Agata commented that the court
in Watkins had resolved the summary arrest situation but had failed to address the summons
situation. See Agata, supra note 17. Although Professor Agata was critical of the court's
limitation of the right to search incident to a summary arrest of a traffic violator, a limitation
which may no longer exist under federal law after Robinson and Gustafson, his observations"
are highly relevant to the situation presented by Palmerand future similar cases.
118. The Illinois Supreme Court is not alone in ignoring the distinction. In Robinson, the
court of appeals observed that the government contended:
[Miost of the courts which have considered the problem of searches incident to
mere traffic arrests have failed to distinguish between "routine" arrests on the one
hand and "in custody" arrests on the other.
471 F.2d at 1106.
119. See Comment, Search Incident To Arrest for Minor Traffic Violations, 11 AM. CraM.
L. REV. 801, 802-05 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Search Incident To Arrest].
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frequently occurs when the driver is without a valid operator's license or is driving on a traffic citation and is required to post a cash
bond. It may also result from a preference of the driver for retaining
his license and posting a cash bond instead.
Although these three situations 2 " are all frequently termed an
"arrest,"'' it does not follow that the same police response is appropriate to each. This was recognized by the United States Supreme
Court in Robinson and Gustafson where it was held that a full
search of the person arrested was permissible in the full custodial
arrest (or summary arrest) situation, but the Court refused to decide
which type of police action was appropriate in the traffic citation
situation.
Professor Agata's criticism of Watkins is directed to the court's
failure "to recognize the distinction and secondly, in applying conclusions based upon summons situations to summary arrest situations merely because the court has chosen to call the issuance of a
' 2 Professor
summon [sic] an arrest."'
Agata argued against the
Watkins rule and in favor of a rule, later accepted in Robinson and
Gustafson, permitting a search incident to a summary arrest.
Searches in the summons situation, however, would not be permitted unless the officer had reason to fear for his safety or unless other
reasonable grounds for a search appeared.
In rejecting the syllogism inherent in People v. Clark,'23 Professor
Agata noted, the court in Watkins'24 adopted another syllogism.
The basis of the Watkins syllogism is that all processes called
"arrest," when used in connection with traffic violations, should
yield the same results on search and seizure issues .... 12.
120. The Palmer case is an example of the first and by far the most common summons
situation. Watkins is an example of the summary arrest situation. Jordan, discussed at text
accompanying notes 89 and 90 supra, is an example of the situation in which the traffic
offender is permitted to drive his own car to the police station.
121. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 526 (1975), which provides a bail schedule for traffic
offenses, states that "a person arrested for a traffic offense and personally served by the
arresting officer . . ." shall post bail in certain specified amounts.
122. See Agata, supra note 17, at 10 (emphasis added).
123. 9 Ill. 2d 400, 137 N.E.2d 820 (1956).
124. In rejecting the reasoning of Clark, the Watkins court stated:
The Clark opinion rests on reasoning that runs like this: (1) a traffic violation is a
misdemeanor; (2) a police officer has a right to arrest when a misdemeanor is
committed in his presence; (3) an arresting officer has the right to search the person
of one whom he arrests. Each of these propositions, taken by itself and with the
limitations imposed by its original context, is correct enough. But when they are
combined, transplanted, and used to govern the interpretation of the constitution,
they produce an improper result.
19 Ill. 2d at 18, 166 N.E.2d at 436.
125. See Agata, supra note 17, at 10.
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Professor Agata criticised Watkins for taking the limitations on the
right to search in the summons situation and applying those same
limitations to prohibit searches in some summary arrest situations. 2 ' In Palmer the same court performed the reverse, taking a
rule which it formerly applied to a summary arrest situation and
applying it to a summons situation. It is ironic that a rule which
originated as a limiting principle restricting police searches incident
to custodial arrests should now be applied to uphold a search which
took place prior to any arrest.
Failure of the Illinois Supreme Court to attach any significance
to the fact of custodial arrest is illustrated dramatically by a comparison of People v. Reed'27 with Palmer, both decided under the
Watkins distinction between ordinary traffic violators and criminals. In Reed, defendant was placed in custody and was to be taken
to the police station to be "checked out," but the search was held
illegal. In Palmer, defendant had not been placed in custody and,
as Justice Leighton observed, there was no intention of placing him
in custody, but the pat-down search was upheld solely on the basis
of the nature of the particular traffic offense and irrespective of
whether a "custodial arrest" had occurred. Under RobinsonGustafson standards, the opposite result would obtain in Reed and
in Palmer as well. Clearly, as Justice Goldenhersh observed, 2"
Robinson and Gustafson are not authority for the search which occurred in Palmer.
Part of the court's confusion in Watkins, as Professor Agata demonstrates,' 2 resulted from misplaced reliance on the Michigan Supreme Court's decision in People v. Gonzales,30 a case factually
similar to Palmer. In Gonzales, the court rejected a claim by the
state that the stopping of a car for a traffic violation embodies the
right to search. Defendant in that case had been stopped by Michigan state troopers because only one headlight was burning. After
issuing a traffic summons to the driver, who had left his car and
walked back to the police car, an officer asked the two remaining
occupants to get out of the car so that he could "check it." The butt
of a pistol was observed protruding from under the front seat. At a
126. As already stated, Professor Agata argued that the police should have the right to
search all traffic violators who have been subjected to a summary arrest and would have
agreed with the Supreme Court's decisions in Robinson and Gustafson.
127. 37 Ill. 2d 91, 227 N.E.2d 69 (1967).
128. 62 I11. 2d at 267, 342 N.E.2d at 356.
129. See also Korth, supra note 17, at 253-54; Barnes v. State, 25 Wis. 2d 116, 130 N.W.2d
264 (1964).
130. 356 Mich. 247, 97 N.W.2d 16 (1959).
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hearing on a motion to suppress evidence the officer testified that
in the early morning hours cars are always checked quite thoroughly, but also admitted that they had no further suspicion in the
instant case. Upon these facts, the question as posed by the Michigan Supreme Court was whether the police who stop an automobile
on a Michigan highway may also routinely search the automobile
3
under Michigan law.' '
Concerning the question of whether or not an arrest had occurred,
the court preferred to examine the search on the assumption that
the officers had made "a lawful, if brief, arrest by stopping and
holding him until the summons was issued."' 32 The court also observed, however, that the officers had no intention of incarcerating
defendant or detaining him further, and therefore concluded: "...
since no further detention was contemplated, there was no need to
search for weapons or other means of possible escape from cus33
tody."1
Although the court did not have the benefit of later cases which
distinguish between "investigative stops" or "forcible stops" and
"full custodial arrests," the court clearly drew a distinction between
the kind of "arrest" which is merely a brief detention while the
officer writes out a traffic ticket, and the type of arrest in which the
offender is taken into custody.
The court also appropriately observed that to permit a search
under the circumstances of Gonzales would "freely allow any officer
to search any automobile on Michigan highways in the early morn'13 4
ing hours after the issuance of a ticket for any traffic offense.'
Although Gonzales involved search of a vehicle, the observation
that no weapons search was necessary because no further detention
was contemplated is certainly broad enough to apply to a search of
the driver as well. Gonzales was relied upon in People v. Zeigler,3 "
a case involving a search of a driver stopped and issued a summons
for a traffic violation. Although the police claimed to have been
acting upon a tip that the driver was engaged in an illegal betting
operation, the court found that the information possessed by the
police did not constitute probable cause to arrest and inquired
whether the search and seizure were lawful because made while
defendant was lawfully under arrest for traffic violations. The court
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 250,
Id. at 253,
Id. at 255,
Id.
358 Mich.

97 N.W.2d at 18.
97 N.W.2d at 18.
97 N.W.2d at 20.
355, 100 N.W.2d 546 (1960).
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quickly concluded that, for the reasons expressed in Gonzales, this
search of the driver was illegal.
It is obvious that the Gonzales and Ziegler cases, relied upon by
the Illinois Supreme Court in Watkins, require a different result as
applied to Palmer. All three cases involved the summons situation
which, by definition, cannot support a search incident to an arrest.
In contrast, Watkins, in which the court purported to rely on
Gonzales, involved a custodial arrest.
Other courts have also distinguished between the summons and
the summary arrest situations. In Barnes v. State,'3 1 the Wisconsin
Supreme Court reviewed both Illinois and Michigan cases and then
"brought two distinctions into clear focus which had not been dealt
with adequately by the Illinois and Michigan decisions."'' 7 The Wisconsin court first distinguished the summons-summary arrest situation.'3 Second, the court criticized the Michigan and Illinois courts
for failure to recognize any distinction between a search of the driver
and a search of the vehicle, indicating that "from the standpoint of
the reasonableness of a search for weapons in order to protect the
life of the arresting officer, the search of the trunk of the car might
well be held to stand in a different category from that of the search
39
of the person of the defendant.'
One commentator has noted that, although some courts and statutes frequently describe all traffic encounters with police as "arrests," such encounters in many courts are more accurately referred
to as "brief detentions."' 4 0 In People v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, the court interpreted the term "arrest" as used in the
vehicle code as a "kind of 'verbal' shorthand." In that case, the
California Supreme Court considered the precise point in time at
which a traffic violator is "arrested." After observing that a police
officer may legally stop a motorist to conduct a brief investigation
as the result of a rational suspicion that a traffic violation may have
occurred, the court declared that "the temporary restraint of the
136. 25 Wis. 2d 116, 130 N.W.2d 264 (1964).
137. Korth, suora note 17, at 254.
138. 25 Wis. 2d at 124, 130 N.W.2d at 268.
139. Id. The Illinois Supreme Court apparently refuses to recognize this distinction and
in Palmer quoted from Brown to the effect that when circumstances indicate that the police
may be dealing with a criminal rather than an ordinary traffic violator, "a search of the driver
and his vehicle is authorized in order to insure the safety of the police officers and to prevent
an escape." 62 Ill. 2d at 264, 342 N.E.2d at 354. The Illinois Supreme Court has never
explained how the search of a car after the driver is in custody will insure the safety of the
officer.
140. See Search Incident to Arrest, supra note 119, at 802-04.
141. 7 Cal. 3d 186. 496 P.2d 1205, 105 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1972).
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suspect's movements incident to that investigation will not ordinarily be deemed an arrest."'' Such cases lead commentators to conclude that "many courts have looked consistently beyond strict
usage of this term in their determination of the fourth amendment
consequences that flow from the motorist's detention."'43
Finally, the distinction between a "full custodial arrest" and the
issuance of a traffic summons was recognized by the United States
Supreme Court in Robinson. In the court of appeals decision the
court had discussed the "routine traffic stop" situation in which the
officer would simply issue a notice of violation and allow the offender to proceed, and had concluded that no search would be authorized in such a situation unless the person stopped gave the
officer reason to fear for his safety."' The Supreme Court expressly
recognized the existence of a separate question where a "routine
traffic stop," rather than a "custodial arrest," occurred and expressly declined to reach the issue."
The Supreme Court's recognition of the distinction should deter
careless application of Robinson and Gustafson to the summons
situation. Apparently concerned about the possibility of misapplication of these cases, Justice Goldenhersh in Palmer chided the
majority for its lack of discussion of the state's reliance on Robinson
and Gustafson, cases clearly not applicable to the pre-arrest search
of Palmer.4 ' Perhaps it was equally obvious to the majority that
these cases were not applicable because at the time of the search
Palmer had not been subjected to a full custodial arrest, but it
would have been helpful for the court to so state. This might have
discouraged wholesale application of Robinson and Gustafson to
justify searches undertaken in the summons situation.
That neither the Watkins rule nor the Robinson and Gustafson
decisions were intended for application to the routine traffic stop or
summons situation, however, is only half of the inquiry. The question remaining is what standards govern such encounters and under
what circumstances the police may conduct a pat-down weapons
search of a motorist stopped for a traffic violation.

Terry AND

THE "ROUTINE"

TRAFFIC STOP

The view of Justice Goldenhersh and the appellate court in
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id.at 202, 496 P.2d at 1215, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 847.
Search Incident To Arrest, supra note 119, at 803.
471 F.2d at 1096-97.
414 U.S. at 441 n.6.
62 I1. 2d at 267, 342 N.E.2d at 356.
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Palmer find support in the decisions in several state and federal
courts to the effect that a pat-down search for weapons is not permissible in the routine traffic stop or summons situation in which
no custodial arrest is intended. In fact, prior to Robinson and
Gustafson, some courts had gone so far as to prohibit weapons
searches even in the case of a custodial arrest for a traffic violation.
Prior to Terry, the New York Court of Appeals in People v.
Marsh,' 7 held that the arrest of defendant on a traffic warrant for a
speeding violation committed two years earlier did not justify a
search for weapons resulting in recovery of a book of matches used
to convict him on a gambling charge. The court held that a search
for weapons is a "special exception to the proscription against warrantless searches" and "should not be extended beyond its purpose
of securing the safety of the officer and preventing an escape."'' 8 The
court reasoned that:
A motorist who exceeds the speed limit does not thereby indicate
any propensity for violence or iniquity, and the officer who stops
the speeder has not even the slightest cause for thinking that he is
9
in danger of being assaulted'
Although the court found this limitation on weapons searches predicated on the fourth amendment, the court also held that the New
York legislature had not intended to authorize a weapons search "as
incident to an arrest for a traffic infraction regardless of whether the
arrest was made at the scene or later pursuant to a warrant, unless
the officer has reason to fear an assault or probable cause for believing that his prisoner has committed a crime" other than the traffic
offense.'w To the extent that the holding in Marsh was predicated
upon the fourth amendment, Marsh has been now overruled by
Robinson and Gustafson insofar as it applied to full custodial arrests, but the Marsh rule still prohibits weapons searches incident
to ordinary traffic stops in the summons situation.''
147. 20 N.Y. 2d 98, 228 N.E.2d 783, 281 N.Y.S.2d 789 (1967).
148. Id. at 103, 228 N.E.2d at 785-86, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 792.
149. Id. at 104 228 N.E.2d at 786, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 792.
150. Id. at 105, 228 N.E.2d at 786, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 793.
151. Several authorities have expressed the view that an officer, who merely
stops a motorist for a minor traffic violation and issues a summons has only "detained," as opposed to "arrested" the driver. If the alleged offender is merely
considered "detained," then the criteria for search incident to arrest is quite obviously inapplicable. Nevertheless, a question as to the right to stop-and-frisk may
still be said to exist.
Search Incident To Arrest, supra note 119, at 804. Professor Nakell has written: "Presumably,
the protection offered by a frisk for weapons would not be available in a traffic stop not
eventuating in a trip to the station house, in which case the officer can initiate a protective
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Following the Marsh decision, Terry v. Ohio"2 and Sibron v. New
York1'53 were handed down by the Supreme Court, holding that a
weapons search is permissible without probable cause where the
officer reasonably concludes that criminal activity may be afoot and
that he is dealing with a person or persons who may be armed and
presently dangerous. One of the first cases to apply Terry to a traffic
arrest was People v. Graves."4 The California Court of Appeals reasoned that the rationale of Marsh that traffic offenders are usually
non-criminals must yield to the principle of Terry and Sibron permitting a reasonable protection search for weapons in every traffic
arrest situation. In extending authority for a routine weapons search
to the simple traffic violation situation, the Graves court cited the
fact that "police officers have been killed or assaulted while making
arrests for traffic offenses."', 5
The California Supreme Court in People v. Superior Court of Los
Angeles County,' however, rejected the rationale of Graves and
held that, absent special circumstances, neither a search of the
person nor of the vehicle is permissible in the routine traffic arrest
or traffic stop situation. The court considered the question of
whether Terry and Sibron would permit a routine weapons search
of a motorist stopped for an "ordinary traffic violation." The violations included a defective brake light and failure to have a car
registration and a driver's license. In rejecting Graves, the court
recognized that Graves was predicated upon "the danger to the
officer and the possibility of escape. . .if the arrestee possesses a
weapon,"'5 7 but noted that in Graves the officer was justified in his
belief that the person stopped, wanted for five recent armed robberies, was armed and dangerous. The court also pointed out that the
Graves court apparently relied upon its "knowledge" that police
officers have been killed or assaulted while effecting arrests for
traffic violations, but refused to hold that the police could reasonably expect that the ordinary traffic offender was armed and dangerous. The court adhered to its earlier assessment in People v. Superior Court of Yolo County,' in which the court refused to permit a
search only when the standards of Terry are satisfied and its scope limitations observed."
Nakell, supra note 4, at 834.
152. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
153. 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
154. 263 Cal. App. 2d 719, 70 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1968).
155. Id. at 735, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 520.
156. 7 Cal. 3d 186, 496 P.2d 1205, 101 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1972).
157. Id. at 204, 496 P.2d at 1218, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 850.
158. 3 Cal. 3d 807, 478 P.2d 449, 91 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1970).
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search of a motor vehicle incident to a traffic stop. Speaking of
vehicles involved in routine traffic violations, the court in Yolo
County had noted: 5 ' "Millions of such vehicles are stopped every
year, and all but a small percentage are doubtless proceeding at the
time on lawful business or innocent pleasure." In Yolo County, the
court concluded that:
Just as the arresting officer in an ordinary traffic violation case
cannot reasonably expect to find contraband in the offender's vehicle, so also he cannot expect to find weapons. To allow the police
to routinely search for weapons in all such instances would likewise
constitute an "intolerable and unreasonable" intrusion into the
privacy of the vast majority of peaceable citizens who.travel by
automobile. It follows that a warrantless search for weapons, like
a search for contraband, must be predicated in traffic violation
cases on specific facts or circumstances giving the officer reasonable grounds to believe that such weapons are present in the vehicle
he has stopped. 0
The Los Angeles County court held that the reasoning of Yolo
County with respect to automobile searches was equally persuasive
when applied to searches of the driver. The court concluded that
ordinary traffic stops provided no more reason for a search than an
on-the-street confrontation and held that the police must meet
Terry standards:
[W]hen a police officer observes a traffic violation and stops the
motorist for the purpose of issuing a citation, a pat-down search
for weapons as an incident to that arrest must be predicated on
specific facts or circumstances giving the officer reasonable
grounds to believe that a weapon is secreted on the motorist's
person. II
Los Angeles County, like Marsh, also held that a weapons search
was not permitted in cases of a custodial arrest for a traffic violation
unless Terry standards were met. In so holding, the court rejected
an earlier decision by the court of appeals which would have permitted a search of every traffic violator taken in custody for transportation to a mag.strate.6 2 To the extent that the holding of Los Angeles
County prohibiting weapons searches of persons subjected to a full
custodial arrest was predicated upon the fourth amendment, it was
also overruled by Robinson and Gustafson, but the California Su159.
160.
161.
162.

Id. at 815, 478 P.2d at 453, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 733.
Id. at 835, 478 P.2d at 464, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 744.
7 Cal. 3d at 206, 496 P.2d at 1220, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 852.
Morel v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. App. 3d 913, 89 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1970).
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preme Court has since rejected the holding of Robinson and
Gustafson and predicated its rule on the California Constitution.63
In United States v. Davis,164 a police officer stopped a motorist for
crossing the center line and driving on the wrong side of the street
and immediately conducted a pat-down search which resulted in
recovery of a large roll of counterfeit money. The court of appeals
held the search illegal under Terry. Another case frequently cited
for the same proposition is United States v. Humphrey,"5 decided
by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
The Michigan decisions in People v. Gonzales' and People v.
Zeigler,"7 although decided several years before Terry, applied a
similar rule to traffic stops in the summons situation; these cases
still represent the law of Michigan.'6
A distinction between a custodial arrest and a brief detention
resulting in issuance of a traffic ticket was also observed by the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals in the Robinson case." 9 The
court observed that in determining the extent to which the legitimate governmental interest of insuring the safety of officers justifies
a search incident to an "arrest," it was necessary to distinguish
between the "routine" traffic arrest where the officer simply issues
a notice of violation and allows the offender to proceed and the more
serious cases where the officer effects an "in-custody" arrest to
transport the traffic offender to the stationhouse for booking. The
routine traffic arrest was likened to the "investigatory stop" described as a "brief-on-the-street encounter."' 710 The court concluded
that routine traffic arrests "where there is no evidentiary basis for
a search and the officer intends simply to issue a notice of violation
and allow the offender to proceed"'' are governed by Terry and
Sibron. The court stated the rule governing routine traffic stops as
follows:
163. See Comment, The Scope of Search Incident To Arrest for Minor Offenses: California's Independent and Adequate Approach, 7 Sw. U. L. REV. 895 (1975).
164. 441 F.2d 28 (9th Cir. 1971).
165. 409 F.2d 1055 (10th Cir. 1969). See also State v. Curtis, 290 Minn. 429, 190 N.W.2d
631 (1971).
166. 356 Mich. 247, 97 N.W.2d 16 (1959).
167. 358 Mich. 355, 100 N.W.2d 456 (1960).
168. In People v. Howell, 58 Mich. App. 152, 156, 227 N.W.2d 266, 268 (1974), Gonzales
was cited for the proposition that "police who stop an automobile on Michigan highways to
issue a traffic ticket may not routinely search the automobile, under Michigan law." The
Michigan Supreme Court observed in People v. Moore, 391 Mich. 426, 434 n.5, 216 N.W.2d
770, 774 (1974), that Robinson and Gustafson "do not conflict with Gonzales."
169. 471 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
170. Id. at 1096.
171. Id.
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Thus the most intrusive search the Constitution will allow in such
situations is a limited pat-down search for weapons, and then only
when there exists special facts or circumstances which give the
officer reasonable grounds to believe that the person with whom he
is dealing is armed and presently dangerous.'
In support of this rule the court relied upon the Yolo County case
for the proposition that the potential for violence in the routine
traffic stop is so remote that to allow the police to search routinely
for weapons would constitute an unreasonable intrusion.'
Although the Robinson case involved a custodial arrest rather
than the issuance of a citation and to this extent the remarks of the
court of appeals are dicta, the opinion nevertheless represents the
carefully considered statement of the full court on the extent of
permissible police intrusion during a routine traffic stop. It is likely
to be followed in future cases involving the summons situation. 7"
The decisions characterizing a routine traffic stop as a "brief
detention" which falls short of an arrest are now the majority. These
decisions have avoided the necessity of determining in each case the
precise point at which the liberty of the traffic offender can be said
to be restricted to the point where he has been "arrested"-a question surely likely to result. This is similar to determining whether
the initial stop of a car was an "arrest" for purposes of the fourth
amendment.
The real issue in these cases, of course, is not the abstract question of whether a person standing by his car waiting for a policeman
to write out a traffic ticket has been "arrested" -but whether in this
type of encounter the fourth amendment permits the police to conduct a search of the person stopped absent some additional circumstances which either provide the police with traditional probable
cause or, at least, provide the officers reason to fear for their safety.
To label such a stop or brief detention an "arrest" may be technically correct, but does it automatically follow that the police may
conduct a search incident to this type of "arrest?" Viewing the
question from the officer's point of view, the question is one of
whether or not the officer is exposed to the risk of attack by the
encounter with the traffic offender. The risk in a given situation will
172. Id. at 1097.
173. Id.
174. The court of appeals decision in Robinson was reversed by the Supreme Court on
the question of the scope of a search incident to a full custodial arrest. The Court referred in
a footnote to what the court of appeals characterized as the "routine traffic stop" and stated
that since the case involved a custodial arrest, "we do not reach the question discussed by
the Court of Appeals." 414 U.S. at 236 n.6.
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probably be the same regardless of the precise point at which it
could be said that the individual's freedom has been restricted to
the point of his being "arrested." As observed by the California
Supreme Court, "the physical risk to the officer is created by the
confrontation as a whole, not by the technical niceties of the law of
arrest." ' The court declared:
The critical question remains, is this the kind of confrontation in
which the officer can reasonably believe that a weapon may be
used against him?'76
In other words, is a routine traffic stop situation in which the officer
would ordinarily issue a traffic summons the kind of police-citizen
confrontation in which a police officer could reasonably believe that
a weapon may be used against him? This question assumes, of
course, the absence of any special or suspicious circumstances which
would give the officer fear for his safety or reason to believe he is
dealing with more than an ordinary traffic violator.
This question was implicity answered negatively by the appellate
court in the Palmer case when it held that the pat-down search of
Palmer was not justified because the officer had no reason to fear
for his safety. Justice Leighton expressly stated that his decision
was based in part on the fact that this was a routine traffic encounter in which the police officer was authorized to issue a traffic summons and the driver could have posted his license or a bail card. The
Supreme Court of Illinois avoided this question entirely, but sooner
or later it must be answered by the Illinois courts or by the legislature.
The rule prohibiting pat-down searches of motorists stopped during routine traffic violations which do not require a custodial arrest
would not expose the police to unnecessary danger. The police who
patrol the streets and highways encounter citizens millions of times
each year without injury. These encounters are far less dangerous
than the usual on-the-street encounter between the police and a
suspect or person engaging in suspicious activity. The police are far
more likely to be attacked when they approach a suspected rapist
or armed robber or a person acting suspiciously in an alley than they
are during the average traffic stop. This prohibition permits the
police to retain the right to pat-down or frisk a motorist who reasonably appears to be armed or presently dangerous or who may be
likely to escape. Such pat-down searches could be conducted when
175.
176.

7 Cal. 3d at 204, 496 P.2d at 1218, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 850.
Id.
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the person stopped resembles a person known to be wanted in
connection with investigation of a crime, or has been driving so fast
or so erratically that the police may infer that he is likely to attempt
to flee, or whenever else the police officer can point to specific articulable facts from which he could reasonably infer that the person
stopped is armed and presently dangerous.
This rule is superior to the Illinois Supreme Court's vague distinction between "ordinary traffic violators" and "criminals" which assures adequate protection neither to the police nor the citizen. That
a person stopped does not appear to be an "ordinary traffic violator"
does not always indicate that the individual may be armed and
presently dangerous; moreover, the term "ordinary traffic violator"
itself encourages a distinction between some traffic violations
thought to be "ordinary" or more "common" and others which occur
less frequently, such as driving without license plates, thought to be
extraordinary. On the other hand, the rule permitting the police to
search "criminals" if applied to permit pat-down searches of persons stopped for traffic violations may not afford sufficient protection to the police. "Criminal" almost implies that there exists probable cause to arrest, which is not required for a pat-down search. A
person may not appear to be a "criminal," yet the police officer
might still reasonably infer that he is armed and dangerous.
Unlike the vague categories of "ordinary traffic violator" and
"criminal," the "armed and dangerous" standard focuses precisely
upon the reason for permitting a pat-down search-the protection
of the officer.
AFTER

Robinsin AND Gustafson

Prior to Robinson and Gustafson the legality of a search of a
traffic violator in Illinois under the Watkins rule depended less on
whether he was taken into custody or subjected to a full custodial
arrest than upon the nature of the traffic violation and surrounding
circumstances. If the circumstances gave rise to probable cause to
arrest and search, the search was permitted, but was in most cases
limited in scope to a search for weapons or fruits of the suspected
offense.' The Illinois Supreme Court, however, did not appear to
177. The scope limitation was emphasized in Terry where the Court stated that "[tihe
scope of the search must be 'strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible." 392 U.S. at 19. The scope limitation principle was thereafter
applied by lower courts to the traffic search situation. See, e.g., United States v. Humphrey,
409 F.2d 1055, 1057-58 (10th Cir. 1969). Earlier cases had also applied a scope limitation
principle to custodial traffic arrests. Barnes v. State, 25 Wis. 2d 116, 130 N.W.2d 264 (1964).
Professor Agata argued in 1962 that searches of traffic offenders who had been subjected to
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recognize any limitation on the scope of a search permissible under
Watkins. ' Even the ordinary traffic violator who was arrested and
placed in custody was therefore protected against a search by two
principles: (1) the rule of Watkins and similar cases that not every
traffic violator could be searched; and (2) the rule which generally
applied outside Illinois that even if searched, the search must be
reasonably limited in scope to the purposes of the arrest. The distinction between the summons situation and the summary arrest
situation recognized by some courts was, of course, an additional
limitation on the right to search, but for the most part it may have
been redundant. As illustrated by People v. Reed, 7 ' a search which
was otherwise illegal would not be made legal merely by the fact of
a custodial arrest.
Robinson and Gustafson eliminated the protection afforded by
both the scope limitation and the principle that not every traffic
violator may be searched.8 0 After Robinson and Gustafson, every
traffic violator who is subjected to a custodial arrest may be
searched without any limitation on the scope of the search solely
because the arrest is for a mere traffic violation.
With the scope of the search principle no longer available to limit
searches of arrestees, the distinction between those who are arrested
and those who are not arrested becomes crucial as the sole determining fact upon which the legality of the search turns.' 1 The distinction between the summons situation and the summary arrest situation, unrecognized by the supreme court in the Watkins line of
cases, suddenly looms very large.' Although the Robinson Court
custodial arrest should be permitted, and suggested that a limit might be placed on the scope
of the search. Agata, supra note 17, at 26.
178. The Watkins line of cases did not distinguish between a search of the person or a
search of the car and recognized no limitation on the search of a person once it was determined
that a search was permitted. People v. Jordan, 11111. App. 3d 482, 297 N.E.2d 273 (1st Dist.
1973), holding that a search incident to a traffic arrest resulting in recovery of a small bottle
of pills exceeded the permissible scope of the search, is one of the Illinois cases applying the
scope limitation to a search incident to a traffic arrest.
179. 37 Ill. 2d 91, 227 N.E.2d 69 (1967).
180. The Robinson Court held that the Terry statement of the scope limitation principle
was limited to the stop-and-frisk situation and did not really apply to searches incident to
custodial arrests. 414 U.S. at 227-29.
181. Other commentators also have noted the importance of the distinction:
A second possibility after Robinson rests on the distinction between a summons and
a full-custody arrest. The Robinson rule authorizing a full search after arrest should
be limited to a full-custody arrest. When a traffic ticket is issued, the officer may
conduct a pat-down search only if the officer reasonably suspects that the motorist
is armed.
Effect on New York Law, supra note 117, at 909.
182. In noting that the factors which determine when a traffic ticket is issued and when
a custodial arrest is made have not been litigated, one commentator observed that "[pirior
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clearly stated that it expressed no opinion on the appropriate rule
in the routine traffic situation in which no custodial arrest was
contemplated, those decisions nevertheless are responsible for the
belief that police officers now may search any person or vehicle in
connection with a traffic offense.
As already demonstrated, the issue is somewhat confused since
there are various meanings of the term "arrest." If the RobinsonGustafson cases stand for the proposition that the police may conduct a full search incident to an "arrest" for a traffic offense, and if
the stop of a motorist for issuance of a traffic citation constitutes
an "arrest," it might be argued that the police may conduct a full
search of any motorist stopped for a traffic violation. That this
result was not intended by the Court is indicated not only by the
footnote in which the Court disclaimed any intention of extending
its holding to the "routine traffic stop" situation, but also by the
Court's careful limitation of its decision to situations involving a
"full custodial arrest."
In both Robinson and Gusta/son, the Court took pains to emphasize that the authority to search was derived solely from the fact of
the custodial arrest.8 3 Several times in the course of both opinions,
the Court indicated that it was applying a rule which permitted a
search incident to a "lawful custodial arrest" or a "full custody
arrest." The concerns of the Court were for the protection of the
police officer who places a defendant in custody in order to transport
him to the police station and the Court noted the great danger to
an officer "in the case of the extended exposure which follows the
taking of a suspect into custody and transporting him to the police
station .. ."84 In contrast, in the case of the ordinary traffic violation which does not result in a custodial arrest, the police officer is
not subjected to the "extended exposure" found by the Court to
justify a search. Superficially at least, the Robinson and Gustafson
decisions seem to have no affect on the traffic summons situation.
Any suggestion that probable cause to arrest can be relied upon
to justify a search in a situation in which no arrest has in fact been
to Robinson and Gustafson, no important issue could be found that would depend on that
distinction." Effect on New York Law, supra note 117, at 909-10.
183. The Court noted early in its opinion in Robinson that it was assumed by the court
of appeals and conceded by respondent Robinson that the police officers ". . .had effected a
full custodial arrest." 414 U.S. at 219. Similarly, in Gustafson, the Court observed that it was
"conceded by both parties below and in this Court that the officer had probable cause to
arrest upon learning the petitioner did not have his license in his possession and that he took
petitioner into custody in order to transport him to the stationhouse for further inquiry." 414
U.S. at 262.
184. 414 U.S. at 234-35.
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made is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Cupp v.
Murphy,"5 where the Court upheld the taking of fingernail samplings from petitioner while he was "briefly detained at the stationhouse,"'8 6 but not subjected to custodial arrest. In a concurring opinion Justice Marshall stated that "when a person is detained, but not
arrested" the search must be limited to precisely the area that led
the police to restrict the person's freedom, but observed that the
fourth amendment would have barred a more extensive search absent an arrest.'87 As if in anticipation of the decision in Robinson,
the Chief Justice and Justice Blackmun concurred in an opinion
which agreed with restriction of the scope of the search to the very
limited purpose of preserving the fingernail scrapings, but stated
their view that "what the Court says here applies only where no
arrest has been made" and does not apply to a search incident to
an arrest, 8 8 which, as was expressed in Robinson, admitted of no
limitations in scope.
The situation in Cupp v. Murphy is similar to the traffic stop
situation; although the police had no probable cause to arrest, petitioner was only briefly detained, but not arrested. Under those circumstances the Court held that a search must be supported by
probable cause to believe that petitioner possessed the evidence
sought in the search. A similar rule results from application of Terry
to the traffic stop situation; a weapons search is permissible only if
the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person stopped
is armed and presently dangerous.
Some decisions of the Illinois Appellate Court have also loosely
cited Robinson and Gustafson for the apparent proposition that a
search of the driver or his vehicle is permissible incident to a traffic
violation. In People v. Cannon,"9 for example, a car was stopped for
failure to have brake lights. Upon learning that the driver had no
driver's license or traffic ticket which might have acted as a temporary replacement, the police officer asked the driver to get out of the
car and then searched the car and found two weapons. The court
found that the case was "governed by" Robinson and Gustafson,
although those cases dealt solely with a search of the person and
said nothing to authorize the search of the vehicle. In People v.
Symmonds, 9 ° although recognizing that Robinson and Gustafson
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

412 U.S. 291 (1973).
Id. at 294.
Id. at 300.

Id.
18 111.App. 3d 781, 310 N.E.2d 673 (1st Dist. 1974).
10 Ill. App. 3d 587, 310 N.E.2d 208 (1st Dist. 1974).
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involved a search of the person rather than the car, the court cited
those cases, as well as others, in support of a car search conducted
after defendant had been removed from the car. However, in People
v. Hendrix,'9' the court held that Robinson and Gustafson did not
permit the search of the vehicle of a driver stopped for having an
inoperative license plate light, who was arrested when he was unable
to produce a driver's license, after which the police searched the car
and discovered a gun. The court affirmed a marijuana conviction
based on evidence recovered from defendant's person, but reversed
the conviction for unlawful use of weapons.
In People v. Tilden,'92 the court upheld the search of the driver
stopped for a traffic violation after the police officer observed an
empty gun holster and searched the car. Although expressing agreement with defendant that the stop alone was "not necessarily"
grounds for the search, the court also observed that "the penumbra"
of Robinson and Gustafson might justify the officer's limited inspection of the person and area immediately accessible to defendant
"even without a prior formal arrest for carrying a concealed
weapon."' 9 3 In a dissenting opinion Justice Johnson made particularly appropriate observations:
[A] traffic stop is analagous to a "stop and frisk" situation-there
is less than probable cause for an arrest; but under special circumstances an officer's apprehension may give him a limited right to
conduct a limited
search of the driver's person for the officer's
protection."' 4
Justice Johnson pointed out that Robinson and Gustafson were limited to situations in which a lawful custodial arrest had occurred,
and that defendant here had not been arrested at the time of the
search, and that those cases were limited to searches of the person,
not intrusions into people's cars to check out suspicions.
Another case in which Robinson and Gustafson are rather
casually applied is People v. Epperly,9 5 in which defendant was
stopped for crossing the center line of the road several times. Defendant was unable to produce a driver's license when stopped. Although the opinion does not indicate that defendant had been subjected to a custodial arrest, the court cited Robinson and Gustafson
for the proposition that "unquestionably there was authority to
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

25 111.App. 3d 339, 323 N.E.2d 545 (1st Dist. 1974).
26 I1. App. 3d 447, 325 N.E.2d 431 (lst Dist. 1974).
Id. at 452, 325 N.E.2d at 435.
Id. at 455, 325 N.E.2d at 438.
33 Il. App. 3d 886, 338 N.E.2d 581 (2d Dist. 1975).
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search defendant's person."'' 6
These cases suggest that the distinction between the summons
situation and the full custodial arrest situation is not so obvious or
appealing to the courts as some lawyers might like to believe. Nor
is it so obvious that Robinson and Gustafson will be limited to
custodial traffic arrests, in view of the appellate court's statement
in Tilden that the "penumbra" of those decisions justify a search
"even without a prior formal arrest."' 97 It is not unreasonable, however, to urge that, if the courts seek to extend Robinson and
Gustafson to permit a search of ordinary traffic violators in routine
traffic stops which would not result in a trip to the stationhouse,
they should simply so state.
Another unanswered question is whether Robinson and Gustafson
will be applied to permit searches of vehicles incident to either a
traffic stop or a custodial arrest. An extended discussion of the
problem of vehicle searches is beyond the scope of this article, but
as already pointed out, the Illinois Supreme Court in the Watkins
line of cases has not meaningfully distinguished searches of the
person and of the vehicle of traffic offenders. At least one Illinois
decision cites Robinson and Gustafson in support of an automobile
search conducted incident to a traffic stop,'98 although in another
case the appellate court held that those cases were limited to a
search of the person.'99 Since neither Robinson nor Gustafson dealt
with the search of a car, the extension of those cases to vehicle
searches has been criticized.
POLICE DISCRETION AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

In Illinois, "as in most jurisdictions and for most traffic offenses
the determination of whether to issue a citation or effect a full arrest
is discretionary with the officer." 00 Following the Robinson and
Gustafson decisions a police officer apparently can search anyone
who commits a traffic violation merely by exercising his discretion
to effect a custodial arrest, subject perhaps to the limitation that
the police may not use the arrest as a pretext for a search.'9 ' Since
196. Id. at 888, 338 N.E.2d at 582. The search was upheld on other grounds. See note 75
supra.
197. 26 Ill. App. 3d at 452, 325 N.E.2d at 435.
198. People v. Cannon, 18 Ill. App. 3d 781, 310 N.E.2d 673 (lst Dist. 1974).
199. People v. Hendrix, 25 Il1. App. 3d 339, 323 N.E.2d 505 (1st Dist. 1974).
200. 414 U.S. at 248 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
201. It has been suggested that the search might be held illegal if a person is arrested
merely to afford a pretext for a search. 414 U.S. at 238 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring). See United
States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932). See also Amador-Gonzales v. United States, 391
F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1968), holding that a valid traffic arrest will not support a search where
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most motorists from time to time find themselves in violation of the
traffic laws, almost anyone who drives a car or is a passenger in a
car may at some time be subject to the exercise of police discretion
in favor of an arrest and search. To permit police pat-down searches
of motorists in circumstances which do not satisfy the Terry requirements would compound "the pervasiveness and discontrol of police
discretion [which] is everywhere acknowledged." ' ' In the traffic
situation where the power of the police discretion to arrest or issue
a summons is virtually absolute, a New York court in a postRobinson decision has not only recognized the importance of the
distinction between summons and arrest, but has stated that the
exercise of police discretion to arrest some traffic violators but not
others under similar circumstances would result in a denial of equal
protection of the laws.( 3 The same court suggested the arrests be
limited by the following rule:
A police officer may arrest for a minor traffic infraction only when
there is probable cause to believe that the offender is guilty of an
offense other than the simple traffic infraction, or there are special
circumstances in addition to the commission of the alleged traffic
infraction.24
A commentator concerned about police abuse of discretion and
pretext arrests for the purpose of conducting a search after Robinson
has suggested that an arrest for an offense which could have resulted
in issuance of a summons should be presumed pretextual, with the
20 5
burden of showing otherwise placed on the prosecution.
One way to lessen the problem of police discretion in traffic stop
cases is to prohibit custodial arrests for all but a few of the more
the purpose of the arrest was to search for narcotics. In holding the search illegal, the court
said:
[Tihe significant element in this case is the danger that the lowly offense of a
traffic violation-of which all of us are guilty at one time or another-may be
established as the basis for circumventing the rights guaranteed by the fourth
amendment. This danger exists in lawful traffic arrests as well as in pretext arrests.
There are no fruits, instrumentalities, and contraband reasonably connected with
an automobile driver's improper turn, speeding, and failure to have a driver's
license-regardless of the arresting officer's motives.
391 F.2d at 318. The danger of police use of a pretext arrest has been considered much greater
after the Robinson-Gustafson decision. It has been suggested that "[riather than letting the
offender go with just a warning or a summons, the police might now make a full custodial
arrest in order to conduct an incidental search." Search of A Motor Vehicle, supra note 17,
at 112.
202. Amsterdam, supra note 17, at 315; on police discretion, see generally DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1969).
203. People v. Copeland, 77 Misc. 2d 649, 650, 354 N.Y.S.2d 399, 401 (1974).
204. Id. at 650-51, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 401.
205. Effect on New York Law, supra note 117, at 908.
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serious traffic offenses. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has suggested that the "policy of law, which permits arrests for minor
traffic violations instead of prescribing the issuance of a summons
without taking the defendant into custody as the exclusive police
action, might well be reconsidered." ' Justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion in Gustafson, went so far as to suggest "that a
persuasive claim might be made in this case that a custodial arrest
of the petitioner for a minor traffic offense violated his rights under
2 7 This suggestion seems
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.""
bold, but when read in the context of the traffic stop situation in
which the police have absolute discretion to determine who will be
subjected to a custodial arrest and search, it becomes clear that the
determination of when a search is reasonable has, in effect, been
delegated solely to the police with the result that motorists will be
secure "only in the discretion of the police.'' -0 8 The arrest for a traffic
violation, formerly reasonable when subject to the pre-Robinson
search limitation, becomes constitutionally unreasonable when it
becomes the vehicle for a search not predicated upon probable
cause, and more importantly not subject to the requirement that
"inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead
of being judged by the officer engaged in the competitive enterprise
of ferreting out crime. ' 20 9 The result will be an abandonment of the
principle that "[w]hen the right of privacy must reasonably yield
to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer,
not by a policeman or government enforcement agent."2 " The
greater threat to fourth amendment rights posed by Robinson and
Gustafson is not that arrestees will be subjected to a search greater
in scope than that formerly permitted, but that the police in their
sole and unreviewable discretion will decide who is to be arrested
and searched.
Some states have prohibited arrests for certain traffic offenses.
California, for example, has three classes of traffic offenses: those
in which the violator must be arrested; those which provide for a
traffic citation or a full custody arrest; and those which provide only
211
for issuance of a traffic citation.
In Illinois, however, there appears to be no category of traffic
offenses for which the police are prohibited from making a custodial
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Barnes v. State, 25 Wis. 2d at 125-26, 130 N.W.2d at 269.
414 U.S. at 266-67.
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1967).
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1947).
Id.
See Effect on New York Law, supra note 117, at 911.
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arrest and taking the person arrested to the police station. For most
traffic offenses the law apparently does not provide for the booking
procedure employed for more serious criminal offenses; the traffic
violator must be released immediately upon posting of his driver's
license or a bail bond card and need not await an appearance before
a magistrate.2 1 A driver's license or bail bond card may be posted
at the scene of the traffic violation and no doubt the vast majority
of traffic offenses are handled in this manner. The only traffic offense which actually requires that the driver be taken into custody
is the offense of driving without an operator's license.
It has been suggested that rules be promulgated by the courts,
legislature, or police department governing the circumstances under
which custodial arrests for traffic offenses are permitted and the
circumstances under which a pat-down search is permitted.'" One
commentator suggested that the Robinson-Gustafson rule be limited to full-custody arrests and that police discretion to make an
arrest or issue tickets be governed by judicial standards, the legislature, or police department regulations.21 4 One of the rules recommended was that "if a traffic infraction is alleged for which a summons is available, the officer may conduct a pat-down search, only
if he reasonably believes that the motorist is armed."2 15
A similar rule was precisely stated by Justice Leighton in his
concurring opinion in Palmer and, although it is quoted above, it is
worth repeating here.
• . . when a peace officer stops a motorist for a traffic violation
which does not require custodial arrest, and the peace officer does
not intend to make one, the "pat-down," "frisk," search or touching of the motorist by the officer, is illegal, unless there is some act
or conduct, or some fact or circumstance which causes the peace
officer reasonably to believe it is necessary to the "pat-down,"
"frisk," search or touch the motorist in order to protect himself or
6
those around him. 21
This rule includes the highly subjective criterion of "intent to arrest" as a justification of a pat-down search. To rely solely upon the
intent of the police officer would be to abandon the objective stan212. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 11OA, § 526 (1975).
213. Effect on New York Law, supra note 117, at 908-12; LaFave, supra note 33, at 167.
Police-made rules governing all police search and seizure activity have been suggested. See
Amsterdam, supra note 34, at 408-39.
214. Effect on New York Law, supra note 117, at 912.
215. Id.
216. 22 111.App. 3d at 872, 318 N.E.2d at 211.
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dard which now prevails.,, 7 Moreover, the problems of proof of police
intent or motives are treacherous 21 8 and likely to result in a police
officer testifying that he did intend to arrest in any case where a
search was made and something was recovered. Rather, it is far
better to adopt a rule which turns not solely upon police intent but
which is anchored to the easily ascertainable standard of whether
or not the traffic offense was one for which a summons could be
issued. The result would be that ". . .police officers would be better
guided as to the limits of their discretion, and motorists would be
more secure in their constitutional rights, knowing that a minor
traffic offense standing alone could not establish the basis for a
search.12 9 In addition, the courts would be spared the determination in each case of both the precise point of arrest and whether the
officer intended to make the arrest. In some cases, the courts would
still have to decide whether the circumstances reasonably warranted the officer's belief that the traffic offender was armed and
dangerous, but this burden would be no more onerous than that
presently imposed under Terry.
It is possible that application of higher standards under the state
constitution might lead the Illinois Supreme Court to reject the
Robinson-Gustafson solution in favor of the rule which formerly
prevailed. Since "the United States Supreme Court standard for
search and seizure are read into Illinois law,""22 however, it seems
unlikely that the Illinois courts will follow the lead of those states
which have rejected Robinson and Gustafson in favor of higher standards under their own state constitutions.22 '
217. See United States v. Jenkins, 496 F.2d 57, 72 (2d Cir. 1974) (validity of search does
not depend upon intent of officer or prosecutor).
218. The problems with evidentiary determinations of the intent or motives of the police
officer make reliance on intent to arrest as a standard undesirable. See LaFave, supra note
33, at 154-55. Honest examination of the cases leads to the conclusion "that many courts will
uphold a search incident to a traffic arrest in the face of clear evidence of an ulterior motive."
Id. at 155. Watkins, which involved an "arrest" by gambling detail officers for a parking
violation, is one of the cases cited for this proposition.
219. See Search Incident To Arrest, supra note 119, at 805.
220. People v. Emert, 1 Ill. App. 3d 993, 274 N.E.2d 364, 367 (2d Dist. 1971); see also
People v. Grod, 385 I1. 584, 53 N.E.2d 591 (1944). The court observed that "the guarantees
of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States are in effect
the same as sections 6 and 10 of Article II of the Illinois Constitution, and are construed
alike ..
" 385 Ill. at 592, 53 N.E.2d at 595.
221. In Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967) the Supreme Court recognized "the
State's power to impose higher standards on searches and seizures than those required by the
Federal Constitution if it chooses to do so." 386 U.S. at 62. Courts in some states have
accordingly rejected Robinson-Gustafson in favor of higher standards under state law. See
Effect on New York Law, supra note 117; Note, The Scope of Search Incident To Arrest for
Minor Offenses: California's Independent And Adequate Approach, 7 Sw U. L. REV. 895
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The Illinois legislature could consider an amendment to the Illinois stop-and-frisk statute222 providing that when a peace officer
stops a person for questioning or stops a motorist for a traffic ticket,
as opposed to making a custodial arrest, and the officer reasonably
suspects that he is in danger of attack, he may search for weapons.
Such an amendment would be a clear indication of legislative intent
that pat-down searches of motorists stopped for routine traffic
violations should not be made unless Terry standards are set.
CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the following points should be stressed. The
Watkins rule resulting in a distinction between "ordinary traffic
violators" and "criminals" for fourth amendment purposes was intended as a limitation on the traditional right to search incident to
a custodial arrest for a traffic violation. Although the Illinois Supreme Court has not expressly recognized the distinction between
summary custodial arrests for traffic violations and routine traffic
stops resulting in issuance of a traffic summons, the Watkins rule
has no proper application to the summons situation.
The Illinois distinction between "ordinary traffic violators" and
"criminals" is vague and fails to afford sufficient protection to either the police or the citizen. Robinson and Gustafson have overruled Watkins to the extent that searches incident to custodial arrests of ordinary traffic violators were previously prohibited, but the
Robinson and Gustafson cases are limited to custodial arrests and
have no application to the routine traffic stop situation. Searches
during a routine traffic stop for a violation for which the police
officer may issue a traffic ticket or summons are governed by Terry
and Sibron. A pat-down search of the driver in such situations violates the fourth amendment unless the police officer reasonably
believes that a pat-down or frisk for weapons is necessary to protect
himself or another person.
The Illinois Supreme Court under Watkins and its progeny has
(1975). See also State v. Kaluna, 55 Hawaii 361, 520 P.2d 51 (1974), rejecting RobinsonGustafson in favor of higher standards under the Hawaii constitution. The possibilities for
independent and adequate state grounds are not limited to state constitutions. In New York
it has been held both before and after Robinson-Gustafsonthat the legislature simply did not
authorize custodial arrests for traffic violations. See People v. Marsh, 20 N.Y. 2d 98, 228
N.E.2d 783, 281 N.Y.S.2d 789 (1967) and cases cited in Effect on New York Law, supra note
117.
222. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 108-1.01 (1975) provides:
When a peace officer has stopped a person for temporary questioning . . . and
reasonably suspects that he is in danger of attack, he may search the person for
weapons.
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not distinguished between searches of the person and searches of the
vehicle, but the better rule, recognized by several other courts, is to
limit searches incident to an arrest of the driver, unless there is
probable cause for a search of the vehicle or such search is actually
necessary to protect the police officer or other persons. After
Robinson and Gustafson the determination of who is to be searched
incident to an arrest is left to the discretion of the police, a circumstance which arguably violates the fourth amendment.
The effect of Robinson and Gustafson, therefore, may well be to
render unconstitutional all arrests made in the summons situation
in which the decision to arrest or not arrest is exclusively within the
discretion of the police. Since anyone arrested will be subject to a
full search incident to the arrest, the decision which the constitution
requires be made by a neutral and detached magistrate has been
relegated to the discretion of the police.
The legislature, courts or other rule-making authority should provide rules to limit the circumstances in which the police may either
arrest and search or conduct a pat-down search for weapons of motorists stopped for traffic violations which ordinarily would result in
issuance of a traffic ticket.

